RE: electronic voting tomorrow

It seems to me that an electronic voting system should adhere to the
following principles:

1. It must present a standardized and unbiased user interface, preferably
closely matching the sample ballots distributed to voters.
2. It must allow voters to cast their ballots in absolute privacy, with no
way to trace a ballot back to the individual voter who cast it without
that voter's willing cooperation.

These first two principles are the "Australian Ballot" principles.

3. It must present the candidates in such a way as to make it no easier to
vote a "straight ticket" (i.e., a single party's candidates in all races)
than a "split ticket." This is the "Office Group" principle.

4. It must produce an immediate paper trail, that can be counted manually,
with no special equipment whatsoever.

5. It should issue a verification ticket to the voter, giving the voter a
permanent record of the ballot.

6. It should be absolutely free of ambiguity. This is the "Butterfly
Ballot" principle.

7. It should have a "commit point" that is as late in the voting process
as possible (e.g., with paper or punch-card ballots, the commit point is
the point at which the person inserting it into the ballot box physically
lets go; on a gear-and-lever voting machine, it is the point at which the
voter pulls the commit lever, opening the privacy curtain. Ideally, it
should be possible for a voter to cast a ballot in the early morning,
return to the polling place in the evening, and (ideally, without
revealing his or her original choices) revise his or her ballot.

8. It should allow a voter to transfer his or her voting authority from
his or her assigned polling place to a more convenient polling place, and
cast his or her assigned ballot.

9. It should provide for provisional voting.

10. It should allow voters to rise up and reveal their verification
tickets, in the event that the election results are suspect. This is the
"voter revolt" principle.

11. It should be compatible with blanket, open, and closed primary
systems, including otherwise closed primaries in which nonaligned voters
are permitted to select a party, and systems in which out-of-party votes
are counted at reduced weight. Compatibility with "Louisiana" primary
systems is not necessary.

12. It must be 100% open source. Anybody can audit the counting of paper
ballots. Any competent mechanical engineer can determine if gear-and-lever
voting machines have been rigged. But when software is proprietary, it
becomes very easy to rig results, with very little chance of detection.