Re: QPRCRTPG and allowed op-codes

Fellow MI geeks:

May I also point out that the roadblocks IBM has placed to
prevent the use of 
privileged MI instructions, and the direct use of NMI at
all, are a major 
component in the AS/400's renowned security, which is one
of its major selling 
points.

I know of not a single case of an AS/400
becoming infected with a virus, or a 
Trojan horse, or a worm.

The only
case I can think of in which an AS/400 was hacked was one in which I 
was
responsible, the AS/400 was a development box running at Sec30, I needed 
the
debugger to do it, and I'll take the details of what I did to my grave. 
I've
never heard of anybody successfully hacking an AS/400 from outside.

The
whole point is that if the security built into the AS/400 is rendered

meaningless, then the AS/400 will lose its biggest selling point, the
biggest 
single reason a customer could have for paying a premium for an
AS/400, rather 
than simply buying an NT server from the lowest
bidder.

--
James_H._H._Lampert
Professional_Dilettante who's quite
content to use the instructions supported 
by
QPRCRTPG.