Re: QPRCRTPG and allowed op-codes

From: <jamesl@hb.quik.com>
> May I also point out that the roadblocks IBM has placed to prevent the use
of
> privileged MI instructions, and the direct use of NMI at all, are a major
> component in the AS/400's renowned security, which is one of its major
selling
> points.

But this is security by obscurity (and many people know how to circumvent
that; some good guys and undoubtly some bad guys). Denying this is to
stick your head in the sand (but many people do).

>
> I know of not a single case of an AS/400
> becoming infected with a virus, or a
> Trojan horse, or a worm.

absence of evidence is not evidence of absence

>
> I've never heard of anybody successfully hacking an AS/400 from outside.
>

Wrong tree. 80% of all computer fraud comes from the inside

> The whole point is that if the security built into the AS/400 is rendered
> meaningless, then the AS/400 will lose its biggest selling point, the
> biggest single reason a customer could have for paying a premium for an
> AS/400, rather than simply buying an NT server from the lowest
> bidder.
>

Some people would disagree with this citing some other feature
where the AS/400 shines (database, no reboot, etc, pick one...)

Anyway this is just perception and perception is not reality, although
in a marketing situation it might be.



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