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I agree that telling customers that the only way to effectively control access to data on the system is by using the native object access control mechanisms is a very useful service. The fact that many customers don't is a HUGE and very serious issue. I do believe, however, that the author either by design or by accident incorrectly identifies the source of the problem. Announcing every user interface that can be used to access data by an authenticated and authorizeduser is a disservice. The author's language is such that he focuses on the interface used to access authorized data rather than the fact that all authenticated users are allowed to access most data. This is not a security exposure inherent in the system. It is an exposure in either the customer's security policy or his/her implementation of it. Yes, it's a huge problem, but there is nothing the system can do to prevent an authenticated user from accessing data to which he/she is authorized. If the author would focus on publicizing the real issue, the greater the likelihood that fewer people will be confused and ignore the warnings. On 5/16/05, rob@xxxxxxxxx <rob@xxxxxxxxx> wrote: > > Frankly I think it was a good service to publish this so that I may fix my > code. And, yes, users who are supposed to ftp files from/to our 400 > should have ftp access. It isn't that hard to write a program to lock > this down. But with "heads up" notifications from people like this, you > can fix it before someone exploits your mistake. > > Rob Berendt > >
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