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> Copying the journal OFF of the OS400 >system removes your ability to know WHO deleted it. Perhaps more intriguing -- A system that includes programs to retrieve or receive audit journal entries and then to transmit them across the network to some other system introduces many points where trouble can be increased. Consider any other program connecting to the remote replication facility and entering bogus journal entries. Or a proxy that modifies entries as they go across. Or simply ending the source program before doing unauthorized actions and then deleting receivers. Replication can make it easier to obscure what happened if someone wants to. Anyone who can break the OS/400 authority to mess up audit journals can certainly mess up replication to the point of hopelessly confusing the issue. If breaking authority is unnecessary because sufficient authority already exists, then the problem is already out of hand. And anyone likely to mess up audit journals is also likely to know more than enough about a replication process. Tom Liotta midrange-l-request@xxxxxxxxxxxx wrote: > 9. Re: Security Audit Journal receiver (Patrick Botz) > >You said... >>Because journals are one of the main ways of detecting unauthorized >>activity it is very important that they are not the weak link. Getting >>journals off of the system also reduces the chance that someone will >>destroy your machine to cover their tracks. > >You're making an assumption that they are a weak link today. Ok. Let's go >with that. My point is that your proposed solution doesn't necessarily >solve the problem. Since, in the end you have to rely on some number of >people not to delete the journal, you need to make sure that if it is >deleted, you can know who deleted it. Copying the journal OFF of the OS400 >system removes your ability to know WHO deleted it. > >We can certainly disagree about this, but my take is that losing that >ability at least offsets any value you might have derived by copying it. > >Patrick Botz >Senior Technical Staff Member >eServer Security Architect >(507) 253-0917, T/L 553-0917 >email: botz@xxxxxxxxxx -- Tom Liotta The PowerTech Group, Inc. 19426 68th Avenue South Kent, WA 98032 Phone 253-872-7788 x313 Fax 253-872-7904 http://www.powertech.com __________________________________________________________________ Switch to Netscape Internet Service. As low as $9.95 a month -- Sign up today at http://isp.netscape.com/register Netscape. Just the Net You Need. New! Netscape Toolbar for Internet Explorer Search from anywhere on the Web and block those annoying pop-ups. Download now at http://channels.netscape.com/ns/search/install.jsp
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