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CRPence wrote:
   And so it is very true, that the same concern exists as an issue with 
the database trigger, e.g. some result is not to the satisfaction of the 
implementor, so when they find the trigger they CHGPFTRG to disable it 
while they do their magic to correct the data.  However in the case of 
either CHGPFTRG or RMVPFTRG, the implementor should at least *know* they 
are bypassing the business rules.  That as compared to accidentally [not 
"accidentally"] bypassing the business rules, which is much more likely 
to occur with I/O access control established outside the database.  The 
trigger is visible, whereas an application as expected arbiter to the 
I/O is not so plainly obvious.  The trigger can be found and subverted, 
but even overlooked, it is still enforced.  However the application as 
arbiter may be easily overlooked as a result of either human error or 
negligence, and overlooked, it will not be enforced.
  
I'll disagree once more just to reiterate my point, and then move on.
It is no more likely to accidentally get around high-security access 
profile than it is to accidentally remove a trigger.  Both require 
subverting security policies which *should* be incapable of being 
subverted.  Otherwise, they're really not security policies.  That 
either one could happen is an abject failure of the system.
Remember, I'm talking about a specific architecture in which the 
database can only be accessed through a specific user profile.  
Subverting that requires an security breach as egregious as that which 
would allow removing a trigger.  A properly deployed security system 
prevents both.  Improperly deployed security prevents neither.
So, in the end, the data protection aspect of trigger vs. I/O module is 
moot: both work exactly the same, and both depend on a properly deployed 
security policy.  And thus the choice between the two should come down 
to an application-driven business decision.
This is simple stuff.  Rather than designing systems based on 
theoretical security lapses, you should instead deploy your systems 
correctly.  If you disagree, then fine.  I can leave it at that.  But 
it's a fallacious argument to say that triggers protect data any better 
than HSA profiles.
Joe
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