Re: Morbid curiosity about a V7R2 feature.

[Vernon Hamberg <vhamberg@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>]

Why can't MESECOFR get to the data? It would already have had to be put 
under the new function usage. But that isn't stated in your example.

To verify (good point, man!), I dug a little further and found this 
statement -

"In V7R2M0, the function usage, QIBM_DB_SECADM, provides a user with the 
ability to grant authority, revoke authority, change ownership, or 
change primary group, but without giving access to the object or, in the 
case of a database table, to the data that is in the table or allowing 
other operations on the table. QIBM_DB_SECADM function usage can only be 
given by a user with *SECADM special authority and can be given to a 
user or a group.

IBM are calling "Database Security Administration". I believe that this 
can be given to any user - that user to which the usage is given does 
not need to be *SECADM that I can see. Therefore, that person would not 
be able to create profiles.

If that is the case, then we have similar challenges in security - be 
careful to whom you give authority. Limit who can create profiles with 
*SECADM. Keep duties separate, so that the database security 
administrator does NOT have *SECADM.

Again, we are responsible for following best practices. I've certainly 
not exhausted that topic here - so it will be interesting to see what we 
all come up with.

And as I said, you do have to trust your people - AND audit.

Cheers
Vern

On 5/13/2014 1:25 PM, rob@xxxxxxxxx wrote:
> I think James is right.
>
> MESECOFR creates user HRCLERK.
> In 7.2 MESECOFR can grant HRCLERK ability to maintain data in the schema
> HRDATA even though MESECOFR cannot get to that same data.  MESECOFR has
> *ALLOBJ and everything else.  But still can't access that data.
> So, MESECOFR can create a user called DELETEME.  And grant DELETEME the
> permission to get into that data.  MESECOFR can signoff and sign back on
> as DELETEME.
>
> Here's a close analogy.
> QSECOFR can do
> WRKSYSVAL QLMTSECOFR
> and set them up so that they can only sign on to terminals they have
> access to.  Even if they have *ALLOBJ, etc.
> QSECOFR tries to sign on to DSP01005 but cannot.  So QSECOFR runs
> GRTOBJAUT OBJ(DSP01005) OBJTYPE(*DEVD) USER(QSECOFR) AUT(*ALL)
> and now they can sign on to DSP01005.
> Or QSECOFR can run
> CHGSYSVAL QLMTSECOFR ...
> and turn it off and back on at will.
>
> So don't give IBM more credit than they deserve.  Or, on a more positive
> spin, don't 'assume' it works like you want it to - verify.
>
>
> Rob Berendt