|
Sounds credible, but the computer that runs the web server has access to
the one that runs the database, etc. so, if one computer gets
compromised, from that one it is easy to reach the rest.
Matt Olson wrote:
I also forgot in the my message, the whole basis for segregation of dutysis a good one. It was explained well by the PCI folks if you ever talk to
an auditor.
attack surface of any one machine because you can't trust that every single
The point of segregating out into separate dutys is to minimize the
piece of software you run on that machine is 100% bug free and will not
destabilize any other component of the system. No one can claim this, not
IBM, not Microsoft, not any one of the OSS dudes. If they do, they are
lying to you.
BIND flaws over the years. Just search google for "DNS BIND Flaw" and
DNS is a good example, you've seen all the horror storys of many, many
you'll find thousands of hits.
server, your DB2 database.
So lets say you run BIND on your IBM i box, along with your WAS, your FTP
attack or privilege escalation, etc) you expose all the other services on
Bind flaw X is exploited (whether through denial of service type of
that box (WAS, FTP, DB2).
at risk. When if you had properly segregated these servers out, you would
So now you have all these other services including your critical DB2 data
have just exposed your DNS data.
platform, etc if you carry this through to all the potential vulnerabilitys
Therefore, PCI security councils logic is sound regardless of server OS/
in WAS, FTP, etc. There are some really nasty FTP bugs out that that can
basically give you root access. And if your looking for websphere bugs,
just search for them, there are LOTS.
councils intent a bit better?
So now, is that a better rebuttal, do you understand the PCI security
with it. FYI, Azure is your thousand of applications proof of concept you
-----Original Message-----
From: Matt Olson [mailto:Matt.Olson@xxxxxxxx]
Sent: Tuesday, September 03, 2013 1:18 PM
To: Midrange Systems Technical Discussion
Subject: RE: iSeries public WEB access, PCI security issues
I never said Wintel, you did. I said Intel. Pick your OS flavor and run
are elusive to find and is very public :-). Or grab yourself a 64
processor x 8 core intel server, pick your OS, and theres your thousands of
applications. Anyone can make something like Azure on premise if you got
the know-how and money to pull it off. The same know how and money is
required for i.
Don't go blaming application from vendor XYZ and say "Microsoft" or
The only thing that destabilizes these systems is the application itself.
"Linux" made a bad product. Vendor XYZ did, or better yet, programmer XYZ
did :-)
you can only do on an i.
There is nothing, zero that you can't do on other intel platforms that
switched the conversation to hardware redundancy. Foul play. Let's say the
-----Original Message-----
From: Nathan Andelin [mailto:nandelin@xxxxxxxxx]
Sent: Tuesday, September 03, 2013 1:09 PM
To: Midrange Systems Technical Discussion
Subject: Re: iSeries public WEB access, PCI security issues
Matt,
We were talking about distributed application architecture. But you
IBM i server is synchronized with a remote backup to recover quickly from
catastrophic hardware failure.
servers can run thousands of applications "just like i"?
Were you ever going to get around to supporting your claim that Wintel
EVERYTHING. Instead of just one of the web front ends failing, your whole
-Nathan
----- Original Message -----
From: Matt Olson <Matt.Olson@xxxxxxxx>
To: Midrange Systems Technical Discussion <midrange-l@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
Cc:
Sent: Tuesday, September 3, 2013 11:17 AM
Subject: RE: iSeries public WEB access, PCI security issues
Your raid controller just failed on your single i box that runs
system just went down. Hmm. Sounds like poor infrastructure design.
list To post a message email: MIDRANGE-L@xxxxxxxxxxxx To subscribe,
Theres your rebuttal.
--
This is the Midrange Systems Technical Discussion (MIDRANGE-L) mailing
unsubscribe, or change list options,
visit: http://lists.midrange.com/mailman/listinfo/midrange-lmoment to review the archives at http://archive.midrange.com/midrange-l.
or email: MIDRANGE-L-request@xxxxxxxxxxxx Before posting, please take a
list To post a message email: MIDRANGE-L@xxxxxxxxxxxx To subscribe,
--
This is the Midrange Systems Technical Discussion (MIDRANGE-L) mailing
unsubscribe, or change list options,
visit: http://lists.midrange.com/mailman/listinfo/midrange-lmoment to review the archives at http://archive.midrange.com/midrange-l.
or email: MIDRANGE-L-request@xxxxxxxxxxxx Before posting, please take a
--
This is the Midrange Systems Technical Discussion (MIDRANGE-L) mailing list
To post a message email: MIDRANGE-L@xxxxxxxxxxxx
To subscribe, unsubscribe, or change list options,
visit: http://lists.midrange.com/mailman/listinfo/midrange-l
or email: MIDRANGE-L-request@xxxxxxxxxxxx
Before posting, please take a moment to review the archives
at http://archive.midrange.com/midrange-l.
As an Amazon Associate we earn from qualifying purchases.
This mailing list archive is Copyright 1997-2024 by midrange.com and David Gibbs as a compilation work. Use of the archive is restricted to research of a business or technical nature. Any other uses are prohibited. Full details are available on our policy page. If you have questions about this, please contact [javascript protected email address].
Operating expenses for this site are earned using the Amazon Associate program and Google Adsense.