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Not odd really. To what a /system operator/ is authorized, is not
static across every organization; not even from one operator to another
on the same system. Similarly there would unlikely be any expectation
that USRCLS(*PGMR) would effect that every compiler and tooling or
serive task that a /programmer/ _might_ perform would be automatically
available [to all *PGMR types]? Only the special authority *ALLOBJ
eliminates the requirement for a user to either have or adopt necessary
authority to access resources.
The USRCLS(*SYSOPR) establishes *only* that:
- SPCAUT(*USRCLS) will effect SPCAUT(*JOBCTL *SAVSYS)
- a feature explicitly requiring User Class *SYSOPR is enabled
[made visible on a menu if that user class attribute is checked, but
typically only when sufficient authority to the /command/ or feature is
*also* available -- UIM menus typically use just a command authority check]
Neither the user class *SYSOPR nor the special authorities *JOBCTL
and *SAVSYS can circumvent [or override] object authorities. No User
Class specified, will effect the automatic grant of any private
authorities; i.e. granting authority is still required to allow access.
As others have alluded, the GRPPRF(QSYSOPR) would implicitly grant
authority to the created user via its group profile, to those objects to
which the user QSYSOPR is already authorized privately.
If on a prior release the system had been customized to GRTOBJAUT
QSYS/PWRDWNSYS *CMD SomeUser AUT(SomeValue), then if the system was
migrated versus upgraded on the same disks, such customizations would
have been lost due to improper system management. That is, after an
install, scripted customizations should be performed again. Noting
however that in most cases, authorities to commands would persist; i.e.
in standard slip-install. Only when a release explicitly changes the
authority would a customization be lost; thus an error in proper system
change management may not be visible until that release. However the
explicit change to *EXCLUDE for *PUBLIC to the PWRDWNSYS *CMD has been
occurring every slip install since V3R2M0. FWiW I am of the opinion
that any such change is a defect when not removed after N+2 onto the
release in which it was first added, simply because the forced loss of
customization [even if only to *PUBLIC] is forcibly lost and then
customization must be performed again in a post-install system change
management script -- and why should it be changed twice versus once?
Regards, Chuck
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