|
> Maybe I want to drop them based on their IP, or time of day, or some other > consideration, and don't want to give them a chance to play around with my > signon screen. Looks to me like IBM overlooked something fairly major. There's always firewalls and/or [the inbuilt] packet filtering.... Locking out based on the time can be handled by the exit point control. I'm rather happy with that breakdown, as somebody filtered out by "structure" (IP address, protocol, destination IP address, source/destination port, and much more) never gets a chance to login. Once a user gets a login screen, I would rather have the locked in login to retrieve and record the user id attempting signon. Since an exit point can change the user id of the person signing in, it's nice to have the original filed away. Even if they get a login screen, I'm not to sure what they're going to play around with. Hide everything but the user id and password and they will "see" no more than they would when signing on via telnet or Client Access. Granted that green screen passwords go via plain text, but there's secure socket layers to handle that as well. IBM may rarely miss something, but I don't think that's the case here....
As an Amazon Associate we earn from qualifying purchases.
This mailing list archive is Copyright 1997-2024 by midrange.com and David Gibbs as a compilation work. Use of the archive is restricted to research of a business or technical nature. Any other uses are prohibited. Full details are available on our policy page. If you have questions about this, please contact [javascript protected email address].
Operating expenses for this site are earned using the Amazon Associate program and Google Adsense.