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Maybe it's time to just try the DCR and see if I get shot down it flames? Rob Berendt -- Group Dekko Services, LLC Dept 01.073 PO Box 2000 Dock 108 6928N 400E Kendallville, IN 46755 http://www.dekko.com |-----------------------------+-------------------------------------------| | "John Earl" | | | <john.earl@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> | | | Sent by: | To| | midrange-l-bounces@midrang| "Midran| | e.com | ge | | | Systems| | 07/20/2004 03:27 PM | Technic| | | al | | Please respond to | Discuss| | Midrange Systems | ion" | | Technical Discussion | <midran| | <midrange-l@xxxxxxxxxxx| ge-l@mi| | m> | drange.| | | com> | | | cc| | | | | | Subject| | | RE: | | | Adopted| | | authori| | | ty vs | | | profile| | | switchi| | | ng | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |-----------------------------+-------------------------------------------| Rob, > But they've already introduced that security exposure by > supporting > profile switching. So why not just have adopted authority > work in the > first place? Again, I don't see profile swapping as a security exposure all by itself, but maybe we can just agree to disagree on this point as it's not central to either of our arguments. > I understand what you are saying about changes breaking > other code. But I > don't find that applicable in this case. I can already > create a program > that does a CALL QCMD, owned by QSECOFR and any user can > run it and then > execute the following command: > CRTUSRPRF USRPRF(DELME) USRCLS(*SECOFR) > But they can't run this command: > CRTUSRPRF USRPRF(DELME2) USRCLS(*SECOFR) GRPPRF(SSA) > OWNER(*GRPPRF) > CPF9802-Not authorized to object SSA in QSYS. > But then user DELME can sign on and do CHGUSRPRF DELME > GRPPRF(SSA) > OWNER(*GRPPRF) The argument against breaking code goes something like this... If I wrote an adopted authority program that does not allow my users to have access to Group profiles (and in fact I'm counting on this behavior), and then IBM changes the basic behavior to "fix" this aspect of adopted authority so that users now have this ability, a potential security exposure is introduced. I don't like this argument, in fact I can cite at least two current examples where some section of IBM code doesn't subscribe to their S.O.P, but because it's been that way for a couple of releases the developers are fighting making changes. I have pretty compelling arguments, but that status quo seems to be stronger than operational consistency :( jte -- John Earl | Chief Technology Officer The PowerTech Group 19426 68th Ave. S Seattle, WA 98032 (253) 872-7788 ext. 302 john.earl@xxxxxxxxxxxxx www.powertech.com -- This is the Midrange Systems Technical Discussion (MIDRANGE-L) mailing list To post a message email: MIDRANGE-L@xxxxxxxxxxxx To subscribe, unsubscribe, or change list options, visit: http://lists.midrange.com/mailman/listinfo/midrange-l or email: MIDRANGE-L-request@xxxxxxxxxxxx Before posting, please take a moment to review the archives at http://archive.midrange.com/midrange-l.
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