RE: IIS to as/400 odbc

Although I don't lie analogies, this one makes some sense:

When I was growing up in the Chicago suburbs in the 1960's, my parents
rarely locked the doors of our house, nor did most of my neighbors.  They
certainly never locked their cars when they were in the driveway.  Today,
though, that sort of thinking is gone, perhaps forever.

The net is much the same way.  It has become, if not an actively dangerous
neighborhood, at least one in which you had best lock your doors.
Proprietary protocols and NAT serve as a locked door.  Sure, a determined
burglar can still get in, but does that mean you should just leave the doors
wide open?

Just a thought.

Joe


> -----Original Message-----
> From: midrange-l-admin@midrange.com
> [mailto:midrange-l-admin@midrange.com]On Behalf Of Joe Pluta
> Sent: Wednesday, August 15, 2001 9:25 AM
> To: midrange-l@midrange.com
> Subject: RE: IIS to as/400 odbc
>
>
> As the script kiddies get more sophisticated, Leif, I think you need both
> strong network policy procedures and proprietary protocols.  I
> don't pretend
> to be able to secure a system against a targeted, malicious attack.  I'm
> just trying to keep people from inadvertantly opening their systems to the
> world.
>
> As Jeffrey Silberberg pointed out, the only REALLY secure system
> is one that
> isn't running.  Other than that, you CANNOT secure a system.
> That's because
> there's one route into a supposedly secure network that will always work:
> compromise a trusted employee.  No security system in the world can guard
> against that.
>
> On the other hand, you can guard against script kiddies and other forms of
> random e-violence (e-vandalism?), and that's what I try to tell people.
> It's a classic trade-off: protection against random attacks vs. extra
> programming effort.  Sort of like taking out fire insurance on your house.
> You probably will never need it, but most banks won't give you a
> mortgage if
> you don't.  I think the same should be true of protection against
> non-targeted security breaches.
>
> Joe
>
>
> > -----Original Message-----
> > From: midrange-l-admin@midrange.com
> > [mailto:midrange-l-admin@midrange.com]On Behalf Of Leif Svalgaard
> > Sent: Wednesday, August 15, 2001 9:09 AM
> > To: midrange-l@midrange.com
> > Subject: Re: IIS to as/400 odbc
> >
> >
> > From: Joe Pluta <joepluta@PlutaBrothers.com>
> >
> > > I personally prefer to use a message-based design
> > > where I have designed the protocol and nobody on the
> > > outside is likely to be able to hack it
> >
> > Joe,
> > I generally agree with you that being in control of the
> > interface is a good thing, but I would disagree with
> > your "security by obscurity" argument. True, if you
> > use a proprietary protocol, that the 'script kiddies'
> > are left out in the cold, but if your system is worthy
> > of attack, the bad guys will get you anyway.
>
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