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If this helps, most common password crackers in the UNIX world start with easy and obvious passwords then move up to "harder" ones. Hence, if your password equals your user ID, it will be cracked in seconds. If the password is a common dictionary word, maybe some minutes to a few hours. Arbitrary characters could take days. Assuming a hacker is an opportunist, they will give up and go elsewhere if it takes too long. Also, if you are monitoring your system & find out you've been attacked, good passwords will buy you enough time to change all the passwords before the old ones could be cracked (if you look at your logs daily, know enough to find evidence of an attack and have the power to change passwords on the spot). This is why in UNIX environments, a good password is a completely random set of characters. It defends against a type of off-line cracking using easily available tools, and assumes the attacker lacks patience. Note that none of this may apply in this case. I'm only explaining the rationale behind the conventional wisdom. At 11:55 AM 6/11/00 -0700, you wrote: >Leif, > >Leif Svalgaard wrote: > >> >> BTW: if you apply any or all of the rules for passwords >> controlled by the QPWD* system values, you make >> the decryption easier as you diminish the key space. >> A long password is not more secure than a short >> password. > >I know that you qualified your comments here, but it bears emphasizing.... > >For the purposes of a brute force attack, a long password may not be more secure >than a short password, but the QPWD* values assist in preventing other kinds of >attacks... specifically those that are aided by trivial or common passwords. >Setting rules that prevent password recycling, the use of dictionary words, or >the awful habit of appending a digit to the end of the last password, will help >keep passwords from being easily guessed by just anyone who happens by. > >jte > > >-- >John Earl johnearl@400security.com >The PowerTech Group 206-575-0711 >PowerLock Network Security www.400security.com >-- > > >+--- >| This is the Midrange System Mailing List! >| To submit a new message, send your mail to MIDRANGE-L@midrange.com. >| To subscribe to this list send email to MIDRANGE-L-SUB@midrange.com. >| To unsubscribe from this list send email to MIDRANGE-L-UNSUB@midrange.com. >| Questions should be directed to the list owner/operator: david@midrange.com >+--- > > +--- | This is the Midrange System Mailing List! | To submit a new message, send your mail to MIDRANGE-L@midrange.com. | To subscribe to this list send email to MIDRANGE-L-SUB@midrange.com. | To unsubscribe from this list send email to MIDRANGE-L-UNSUB@midrange.com. | Questions should be directed to the list owner/operator: david@midrange.com +---
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