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  • Subject: Re: setsppfp bug
  • From: Gary Guthrie <GaryGuthrie@xxxxxxxx>
  • Date: Fri, 09 Jun 2000 17:15:45 -0500

I kept a lid on it from the USER community.

I DID go to IBM. I won't mention names, but there was no interest shown.
The IBMer didn't want to give me enough credit that I knew what I was
talking about. When I next tried, I could have maybe gotten through to
them, but first they wanted a Support Line contract or hourly rates
paid. That was enough for me to just let them ignore it.

Let's all be realistic - there's no way in the world that IBM just
simply didn't realize that the user's password was stuffed out there at
sign-on time. They knew it and ignored it because those of us not in the
security-clique are just plain too dumb to discover things on our own.

This is nothing new, though. Way back to the days of the S/38 I've
witnessed the user community getting the "you're too dumb" attitude from
IBM in a variety of ways.

Don't get me wrong - I'm a HUGE, even GIGANTIC, IBM fan and have an
excellent working relationship with them for the most part. It seemed
they wanted to ignore this problem, so I obliged them by ignoring and
not telling, too.



Gary Guthrie



Leif Svalgaard wrote:
> 
> Gary,
> 
> It would seem to me that "keeping a lid" on a hole is a
> dubious way of dealing with a real issue. That's security
> by obscurity. Why did you not urge IBM to fix it a long,
> long time ago rather to allow the hole to exist.
> The assumption that "the bad guys" would not
> come across it is not a valid security policy.
> 
> Leif
> 
> ----- Original Message -----
> From: Gary Guthrie <GaryGuthrie@home.com>
> To: <MI400@midrange.com>
> Sent: Friday, June 09, 2000 1:31 PM
> Subject: Re: setsppfp bug
> 
> > Dan,
> >
> > I've kept a lid on this hole for a long, long time. It appears that it
> > is now becoming common knowledge. You have almost everything you need to
> > take care of the problem except perhaps a little work management
> > knowledge. I'll send you details on plugging this hole (unfortunately,
> > there are other holes).
> >
> > Gary Guthrie
> >
> >
> >
> > "Bale, Dan" wrote:
> > >
> > > Since the startup program can be secured, would this be a good interim
> step
> > > until (if?) IBM fixes this bug?  Would you be willing to publish this
> > > "eraser"?
> > >
> > > - Dan Bale
> > >
> > > > -----Original Message-----
> > > > From: Leif Svalgaard [SMTP:leif@leif.org]
> > > > Sent: Friday, June 09, 2000 1:13 PM
> > > > To:   MI400@midrange.com
> > > > Subject:      Re: setsppfp bug
> > > >
> > > > From: Bale, Dan <DBale@lear.com>
> > > >
> > > > > Well, this has been a fascinating, eye-opening, experience.  I have
> > > > > retrieved several user IDs and passwords now.  So now we have a real,
> > > > live,
> > > > > working sniffer at level 30 & below.
> > > > >
> > > > > Don already asked the general question (and didn't get a direct
> answer),
> > > > so,
> > > > > what are the practical steps a shop can take *NOW* to prevent someone
> > > > from
> > > > > using the setsppfp API?  Can we slap *exclude authority on the
> object?
> > > > > Oops, I see there's no object by that name.  Is there a way to sniff
> the
> > > > > sniffer?  In other words, is there a way to tell if someone else is
> > > > using
> > > > > the setsppfp procedure?
> > > >
> > > > I think that Steve Glanstein's suggestion about having a startup
> program
> > > > that erases the information in the buffer is one way to go. Both Steve
> and
> > > > I have written such a program. The hole is that IBM does not erase it,
> > > > but just lets it sit.
> > > +---
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