AS/400 security ignored

I work at a bank which recently upgraded to a 620 running software from
Jack Henry and Associates from an ES/9000 running VSE and bizarre custom
software.  Needless to say, I was ecstatic.

Despite repeated warnings, however, the ES/9000 guy has left several joe
(userid=password) user profiles on the box.  Many of them are
USRCLS(*SECOFR) or possess special authorities that would make gaining all
other authorities trivial.  

One user profile, for example, is used exclusively for ftp transfers.  For
some reason, it's *SECOFR.  Worse, it is found in several ftp scripts.  

The fact that the box does *bank* processing is especially worrisome to
me.  Mere deletion of the entire box would be bad enough, but in this
case, an attacker might instead do some very difficult-to-detect
embezzlement.

I am quitting my job there soon, for obvious reasons.  If you'd like to,
offer predictions about the future of a bank that will not pay attention
to important security matters.  I would find it amusing to prepare a stack
of "fire him" emails from AS/400 professionals around the globe for my
superiors.

Thanks.

-brian


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