RE: setsppfp bug

> -----Original Message-----
> From: dhandy@isgroup.net [mailto:dhandy@isgroup.net]
> 
> And secure your sign-on DSPF from changes.
> 
> What amazes me is how much attention Gene's 17-line RPG program is
> attracting, while nobody has said anything about the 1-line DDS change
> which works even at security level 50!  Like so many things, it seems
> so blatantly obvious when you hear about it.  It makes you wonder why
> you didn't think of it years ago.
> 
> I'm not saying Gene's program doesn't deserve the attention it gets --
> it does -- but why has nobody mentioned the trivial LOGINP exploit?

The LOGINP exposure was "public" knowledge on the /38 back in the '80's - my
old mentor showed it to me in 1987.  (We demonstrated that a /38 at another
site was vulnerable to it, even though they had gone to the new user
profile/password signon option.)  I suspect that back then IBM would answer
any reports of the problem with "working as designed" - after all, you could
still get the /38 to show you the passwords back then.  Even today, I'll bet
the answer is likely to be something like "secure your subsystems so that
the display files can't be changed illegitimately".  After all, how can IBM
disallow LOGINP for specific fields in a specific type of display file?
Come up with an implementation that won't break legitimate uses of the
function, please.

Dave Shaw
Spartan International, Inc.
Spartanburg, SC
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