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Well, actually, at this point, that IS the point... I haven't gotten to the "other" file systems yet. So, at this point, I'm still goin' down the golden brick road. The problem is that I can't see all the dips that are ahead of me in that road which will require a different methodology. Therefore my question about what the swapping looks like... Dave -----Original Message----- From: security400-bounces@xxxxxxxxxxxx [mailto:security400-bounces@xxxxxxxxxxxx] On Behalf Of rob@xxxxxxxxx Sent: Thursday, September 07, 2006 1:04 PM To: Security Administration on the AS400 / iSeries Subject: Re: [Security400] Commands for Limited Users No Dave, that isn't the point. That "was" the point. But if you look at John's last sentence. <snip> But adopted authority has a serious shortcoming that limits it's usefulness in the file systems that the majority of new applications would use. </snip> If I do a MD DIR('/scratch') CHGAUT OBJ('/scratch') USER(*PUBLIC) DTAAUT(*EXCLUDE) OBJAUT(*NONE) CHGOWN OBJ('/scratch') NEWOWN(BUBBA) A program that adopts the authority of BUBBA will still not have authority to data in this directory. You need to do profile switching to get access. See the profile handle api's at http://publib.boulder.ibm.com/infocenter/iseries/v5r4/topic/apis/sec1.ht m An example of profile handling is if you use any netserver drives on your i5, or if you use WDSC or any other such client server application. Then you could do a WRKOBJLCK OBJ(MYID) OBJTYPE(*USRPRF) In there you will find jobs that are running under one user id, but "servicing" another. Rob Berendt -- Group Dekko Services, LLC Dept 01.073 PO Box 2000 Dock 108 6928N 400E Kendallville, IN 46755 http://www.dekko.com "Turnidge, Dave" <DTurnidge@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> Sent by: security400-bounces@xxxxxxxxxxxx 09/07/2006 01:51 PM Please respond to Security Administration on the AS400 / iSeries <security400@xxxxxxxxxxxx> To "Security Administration on the AS400 / iSeries" <security400@xxxxxxxxxxxx> cc Subject Re: [Security400] Commands for Limited Users But, isn't that the point? In our case, all production objects are owned by one user profile. When a user comes through a menu, they adopt that owning profile's authority. Outside of the menu, (as in other methods of access), they don't have authority, unless it is granted individually, or to a group profile. -----Original Message----- From: security400-bounces+dturnidge=oldrepublictitle.com@xxxxxxxxxxxx [mailto:security400-bounces+dturnidge=oldrepublictitle.com@xxxxxxxxxxxx] On Behalf Of John Earl Sent: Thursday, September 07, 2006 12:47 PM To: Security Administration on the AS400 / iSeries Subject: Re: [Security400] Commands for Limited Users Edwin,
Correct me if I am wrong, but the proper way to secure this object would be to have *public with *exclude, "/Serviceprofile/" with *all (or as needed) and then do a CHGPGM /pgmname/ USRPRF(*owner) to adopt the service profiles authority. Then do a CHGOBJOWN OBJ(/pgmname/) OBJTYPE(*PGM) NEWOWN(/Serviceprofile/) which will make the owner of the program the service profile.
If you accuse me of being a stickler for detail on this point, I'll accept the charge, but I would characterize the authorization scheme you have outlined here is an "adopted authority" scheme rather than an "object authority" scheme. To me an object authority scheme is one where all users of a file are granted authority to that file either directly, through one of their group profiles, or via an authorization list, and an adopted authority scheme is one where no users are allowed direct access to the data unless they go through an approved interface, and that interface is able to provide the requisite authority to get the job done. I like, and use, adopted authority schemes. But I don't think they are the same thing as object authority (maybe that is just my own semantic bugaboo). I'm also aware of the limitation that threatens their obsolescence (the fact that adopted authority is not supported in file systems other than QSYS.LIB). Most of the newer web based applications are use objects in file systems other than QSYS.LIB, so a traditional adopted authority scheme will not be effective. And this is the point that leaves me confused about the whole "object level security" promotion. Most of the folks that I have heard promote OLS as "the correct way" to do secure a System i, don't really mean OLS, they mean "adopted authority". But adopted authority has a serious shortcoming that limits it's usefulness in the file systems that the majority of new applications would use. jte -- John Earl | Chief Technology Officer The PowerTech Group 19426 68th Ave. S Seattle, WA 98032 (253) 872-7788 ext. 302 john.earl@xxxxxxxxxxxxx www.powertech.com Celebrating our 10th Anniversary Year!
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