Has anyone on the list received specific questions or had discussions
related to how the use of DDM from system to system affects the
determination of scope for the PCI DSS?
The primary goal of any organization subject to implementing and maintaining
the controls required by the PCI DSS is to simply limit the scope of
networks and systems that are part of the cardholder data environment (well,
it ain't always simple!). In a multi-partitioned IBM i environment, there
are some LPARs in-scope and many that are not, but the not-in-scope systems
do indeed interface with the in-scope systems via DDM. The easy answer is
exit programs with rules that control inbound access to the in-scope LPARs,
but I was wondering if anyone else has done something differently or
possibly even came up with a good answer as to why additional controls for
DDM are not needed (perhaps, due to some whiz-bang IBM i architecture 'this
or that' kind of thing, etc.)?
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