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Joe, that's not necessarily the case. Here we use a 3rd party penetration test firm (not IBM) to probe our network & systems. There are many things that can be revealed by the tests. Typically, you'll want to do at least 2 tests. The first is to find what your exposures are because chances are you don't know about some of them. Then you analyze the report from the vendor and close all the holes you can. Then you do it again to see the new result. Ideally you do it continually to find new exposures as they occur, be they from new vulnerabilities being identified to new servers going online to changes in the infrastructure. They don't have to mean your security policy or implementation is bad. Our service acknowledges that a perfect score is practically unattainable for any network connected to the Internet. Taking Windows as an example, you might have an IIS server that completely passes the pen tests one week but has three exposures the next. That's more than likely the result of new vulnerabilities being identified and updates to the pen test process than it is a sudden lapse in the server's security. Even if Dekko's (I see the posts and keep thinking his name is Rob Dekko...) security is poor now, at least they're working on it. Chances are, though, that it's not poor but simply hasn't been maintained as well as it could be. And that applies to all levels of the infrastructure: firewalls, routers, VPNs, web & app servers (hardware + OS), web & app servers (web/app server application a la IIS, Apache, WebSphere), and the underlying applications. All the vendors, from Cisco to IBM to Oracle, etc. all have flaws that get uncovered from time to time. And of course Rob wouldn't want to reveal on a public forum what their issues are. Anyone reading the message could potentially exploit the threat before Dekko resolves the issues. Maybe Rob can give us a sample or two after they're satisfied they've solved the problems. If not, maybe just a list of PTFs... Oh, here's the link to IBM's security assessment services: http://www-1.ibm.com/services/us/index.wss/of_services/bcs/a1002367 John A. Jones, CISSP Americas Information Security Officer Jones Lang LaSalle, Inc. V: +1-630-455-2787 F: +1-312-601-1782 john.jones@xxxxxxxxxx -----Original Message----- From: Joe Pluta [mailto:joepluta@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx] Sent: Thursday, January 27, 2005 12:04 PM To: 'Midrange Systems Technical Discussion' Subject: RE: IBM's benevolent hacking I'm not sure what this paragraph means, but I'll bite. It sounds like your security setup is pretty terrible. Additionally, it sounds like you're blaming at least some of your problems on OS/400, but you're not going tell us what those problems are. If that's the case, then maybe you can tell us what part of IBM you contracted with, and exactly what you contracted to them for, and that way your post might have some benefit to the rest of us. Joe > From: rob@xxxxxxxxx > > Contracted with IBM to do benevolent hacking. Greatest outsourcing we've > ever done. Got this 40+ page document. It listed several "incidents" we > need to address. I am not permitted to post them on this list. On thing > that I thought was pretty sharp, IBM called and said "person ... went to > website ... and that tried to install some malicious code. You need to > block ...". Now I have to open a new flurry of pmr's that I would love to > post to this list but a rather stern warning from the boss, and, well, > that ain't going to happen. -- This is the Midrange Systems Technical Discussion (MIDRANGE-L) mailing list To post a message email: MIDRANGE-L@xxxxxxxxxxxx To subscribe, unsubscribe, or change list options, visit: http://lists.midrange.com/mailman/listinfo/midrange-l or email: MIDRANGE-L-request@xxxxxxxxxxxx Before posting, please take a moment to review the archives at http://archive.midrange.com/midrange-l. This email is for the use of the intended recipient(s) only. If you have received this email in error, please notify the sender immediately and then delete it. If you are not the intended recipient, you must not keep, use, disclose, copy or distribute this email without the author's prior permission. We have taken precautions to minimize the risk of transmitting software viruses, but we advise you to carry out your own virus checks on any attachment to this message. We cannot accept liability for any loss or damage caused by software viruses. The information contained in this communication may be confidential and may be subject to the attorney-client privilege. If you are the intended recipient and you do not wish to receive similar electronic messages from us in future then please respond to the sender to this effect.
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