RE: security hole in interactive sql call statement?

["Lim Hock-Chai" <Lim.Hock-Chai@xxxxxxxx>]

correct.  Just a bit disappointed with this security hole in strsql.  We'll 
probably have to lock programmer out of STRSQL for now.  To secure the JOBD is 
not easy because programmer is using the same user ID to access the production 
application.  Some of the program is coded to submit the job with user(*jobd).  
In this case, the program will error out.

Programmer cannot create program in production.  Their user profile is 
LMTCPB(*YES).  Well, that is if they do not have access to strsql.  If the 
programmer use ODBC or JDBC, it will be caught by the Database Server exit 
program.   

-----Original Message-----
From: midrange-l-bounces@xxxxxxxxxxxx
[mailto:midrange-l-bounces@xxxxxxxxxxxx]On Behalf Of CWilt@xxxxxxxxxxxx
Sent: Tuesday, November 16, 2004 2:11 PM
To: midrange-l@xxxxxxxxxxxx
Subject: RE: security hole in interactive sql call statement?


Lim,

You problem isn't that the programmer has authority to CLRPFM.  The problem
is the programmer has the authority to the PRODJOBD job description and the
user profile named there.

Note: at security level 40 or 50.  When using SBMJOB USER(*JOBD), the
submitting user must have authority to both the JOBD and the user profile
named in the jobd.  At security level 30 and below, only authority to the
JOBD is needed.


Let me give you another example of how this could be exploited by your
programmers.  All the programmer would need to do is write a CL program to
do the very same thing!  Or better yet, write a program that swaps to the
profile then calls QCMD.