RE: security hole in interactive sql call statement?

["Lim Hock-Chai" <Lim.Hock-Chai@xxxxxxxx>]

In a sense that is what we thought we have achieved.  We go one level deeper.  
We put security on data files!  Programmer  have view access to most data 
files.  The library is also secured.  Programmer cannot added object to it.  
Therefore not able to use CREATE TABLE.  This lead us to conclude that there is 
not big deal even though programmer can access STRSQL.  
Well, wrong.  In the STRSQL session, programmer can do CALL QCMDEXC('sbmjob 
cmd(clrpfm xxx) jobd(PRODJOBD) user(*JOBD)', 000000060.00000)).  

(Note:  I think most of the commonly use ibm commands are *public *use).
 

-----Original Message-----
From: midrange-l-bounces@xxxxxxxxxxxx
[mailto:midrange-l-bounces@xxxxxxxxxxxx]On Behalf Of CWilt@xxxxxxxxxxxx
Sent: Tuesday, November 16, 2004 11:21 AM
To: midrange-l@xxxxxxxxxxxx
Subject: RE: security hole in interactive sql call statement?


Look at it from the other end....

Instead of trying to find and secure every possible way of calling a
command, including any news ones that may be added, you simply secure the
commands that can be called.

Again, why are the IBM defaults not enough?  The default authority for IBM
commands is generally plenty secure.  If WRKACTJOB is just an example, what
is a specific command that you have a problem with?  

Charles Wilt
iSeries Systems Administrator / Developer
Mitsubishi Electric Automotive America
ph: 513-573-4343
fax: 513-398-1121
 

> -----Original Message-----
> From: Lim Hock-Chai [mailto:Lim.Hock-Chai@xxxxxxxx]
> Sent: Tuesday, November 16, 2004 11:57 AM
> To: Midrange Systems Technical Discussion
> Subject: RE: security hole in interactive sql call statement?
> 
> 
> well, WRKACTJOB is just an example I used.  If user can call 
> qcmdexc, the LMTCPB is pretty much useless and to look thru 
> and secure all the ibm commands is not an easy task.  sooo, 
> The next question would probably be:  why not just secure the 
> call command or qcmdexc program.  Well, having some problems 
> with it at the moment.  These two objects are so commonly use 
> that some other problems are popping up when securing them.  
> oh, well, its a fun day.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> -----Original Message-----
> From: midrange-l-bounces@xxxxxxxxxxxx
> [mailto:midrange-l-bounces@xxxxxxxxxxxx]On Behalf Of 
> CWilt@xxxxxxxxxxxx
> Sent: Tuesday, November 16, 2004 9:57 AM
> To: midrange-l@xxxxxxxxxxxx
> Subject: RE: security hole in interactive sql call statement?
> 
> 
> If the IBM defaults are not good enough for you, then that is 
> your only
> option.
> 
> IBM ships WRKACTJOB with PUBLIC *USE.
> 
> You apparently don't want everybody to be able to use it, so 
> you're only
> choice is to change it and any similar command to PUBLIC *EXCLUDE.
> 
> Of course, this begs the question...why do you think the 
> public shouldn't be
> allowed to use WRKACTJOB?
> 
> The IBM defaults should be plenty secure enough for 99.9% of 
> the shops out
> there.
> 
> Charles Wilt
> iSeries Systems Administrator / Developer
> Mitsubishi Electric Automotive America
> ph: 513-573-4343
> fax: 513-398-1121
>  
> 
> > -----Original Message-----
> > From: Lim Hock-Chai [mailto:Lim.Hock-Chai@xxxxxxxx]
> > Sent: Tuesday, November 16, 2004 10:07 AM
> > To: Midrange Systems Technical Discussion
> > Subject: RE: security hole in interactive sql call statement?
> > 
> > 
> > are you suggesting putting security on all ibm commands?  
> > doesn't sound like a simple task.  Any suggestion on how to 
> > implementer this?  
> > 
> > 
> > 
> > -----Original Message-----
> > From: midrange-l-bounces@xxxxxxxxxxxx
> > [mailto:midrange-l-bounces@xxxxxxxxxxxx]On Behalf Of 
> > CWilt@xxxxxxxxxxxx
> > Sent: Tuesday, November 16, 2004 8:58 AM
> > To: midrange-l@xxxxxxxxxxxx
> > Subject: RE: security hole in interactive sql call statement?
> > 
> > 
> > If your programmers shouldn't be allowed to do a WRKACTJOB, 
> then they
> > shouldn't have authority to the WRKACTJOB command.
> > 
> > HTH,
> > Charles
> > 
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