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Walden, Again, excellent points. What I wonder is 1000 folks in the community would be willing to chip in to find that 1 hole in 1000...? I would. If including all the folks work in businesses that run 400s, it may even be possible for 1 million folks to chip in to find that 1-in-a-million variety of hole. The reason I say they **might** is because if that 1 hacker in a million gets access to the wrong information, the whole stability of e-business is shaken... And as the business world gets more and more into e-business, the target becomes more and more tempting to hackers. So I think it'd be safer to assume that the 1 in a million hack WILL happen, than assume it won't, in the near future. As this becomes more frequent, it will apply some hard brakes to e-business reaching it's potential... jt | -----Original Message----- | From: midrange-l-admin@midrange.com | [mailto:midrange-l-admin@midrange.com]On Behalf Of Walden H. Leverich | Sent: Monday, December 17, 2001 1:47 PM | To: 'midrange-l@midrange.com' | Subject: RE: Where are all of the /400's going. (was RE: QUSER on ODBC | requests) | Importance: High | | | I guess it's a question of when are you secure enough? Note that I said | changing the serial number was "almost trivial" not "almost | trivial without | secofr-level access". If someone has secofr-level access then I | wouldn't be | too concerned with the serial number issue. <G> Digital certificates, | encryption (IPSEC, SSL, PGP, DES, etc.) could all add to the level of | security, but if it's coded somewhere then it's hackable. It's | not until you | add in things like bio-metrics (retina, fingerprint, etc.) that | you get to a | degree of unhackability and even then, I don't need you, just your eye or | finger. | | Can white-hat hackers help, maybe. But it would also be up to the owner of | the code to make changes according to the findings of the | community and the | owner would need development dollars to make those changes. Would the | community be willing to spend development money (in the form of | maintenance | fees) to fix a hole that 1 in a million people might find? Probably not. A | hole that 1 in 10 might find, probably yes. A hole that 1 in 1000 might | find? Hard to say. | | As far as details of the Profile Manager tool go, yes that is vb | code in the | example. VB makes a great test platform for COM since it's so damn easy. | I'll contact you off-list with more details on the tool itself since I'd | hate to be accused of posting something that might tarnish the dignity of | this forum! <G> | | -Walden | | ------------ | Walden H Leverich III | President | Tech Software | (516)627-3800 x11 | WaldenL@TechSoftInc.com | http://www.TechSoftInc.com | | | | -----Original Message----- | From: jt [mailto:jt@ee.net] | Sent: Monday, December 17, 2001 00:20 | To: midrange-l@midrange.com | Subject: RE: Where are all of the /400's going. (was RE: QUSER on ODBC | requests) | | | Walden, | | Dag...:-( ! ! (But thanks for info.) | | I didn't know, but was afraid of that... | | So the question becomes, CAN that be prevented...?!? Most likely by the | services of white-hat hackers...? And a method of rapidly delivering new | security methods, as weaknesses are (hopefully pro-actively) discovered, a | la DNS... | | jt | | | -----Original Message----- | | From: midrange-l-admin@midrange.com | | [mailto:midrange-l-admin@midrange.com]On Behalf Of Walden H. Leverich | | Sent: Monday, December 17, 2001 12:02 AM | | To: 'midrange-l@midrange.com' | | Subject: RE: Where are all of the /400's going. (was RE: QUSER on ODBC | | requests) | | | | | | It's late so I'll wait until tomorrow to elaborate on the tool, but as | | far as hacking the AS/400 serial number, yes it can and has been done. | | If you know an address or two it's almost trivial. | | | | -Walden | | | | | | ------------ | | Walden H Leverich III | | President | | Tech Software | | (516)627-3800 x11 | | WaldenL@TechSoftInc.com | | http://www.TechSoftInc.com | | | | | | | | -----Original Message----- | | From: jt [mailto:jt@ee.net] | | Sent: Sunday, December 16, 2001 23:01 | | To: midrange-l@midrange.com | | Subject: RE: Where are all of the /400's going. (was RE: QUSER on ODBC | | requests) | | | | | | Walden, | | | | Is that VB? | | | | VERY interested in this tool, if you wanna elaborate. | | | | ==> But here's the thing: (I'm NOT contradicting you, but just asking | | the | | question.) Has it ever been done AND/OR IS it theoretically | | possible: COULD | | a 400 machine serial number be hacked...?!? I guess I'm asking | if there's | | ANY WAY CONCEIVABLE? I think this is a key question. | | | | jt | | | | | | | | | -----Original Message----- | | | From: midrange-l-admin@midrange.com | | | [mailto:midrange-l-admin@midrange.com]On Behalf Of Walden H. | | | Leverich | | | Sent: Sunday, December 16, 2001 4:27 PM | | | To: 'midrange-l@midrange.com' | | | Subject: RE: Where are all of the /400's going. (was RE: QUSER on ODBC | | | requests) | | | Importance: High | | | | | | | | | I'm not sure if you could keep ahead of the hackers, but I'd guess | | | not. I forgot about CPU serial number, but my intent is to include | | | it in the tool too (this isn't theory for me). Since we can safely | | | say that this tool will be used in the corporate environment I don't | | | see a problem saying that the PCs involved must allow the retrieval | | | of the Intel serial number. AFAIK, there is no way to emulate or | | | override the CPUID machine instruction so this would be very | | | difficult to hack. | | | | | | In a COM environment you'd use to tool something like: | | | | | | Dim upm as new ProfileManager | | | Dim usr as string | | | Dim pwd as string | | | | | | upm.GetProfile("AS400Name", "ServiceName") | | | Usr = Upm.User | | | Pwd = Upm.Password | | | Set upm = nothing | | | | | | ServiceName is site-specific and could include things like | | | "EndOfMonth Accounting FTP" or "VRU Password Download" or whatever | | | floats your boat. | | | | | | -Walden | | | | | | ------------ | | | Walden H Leverich III | | | President | | | Tech Software | | | (516)627-3800 x11 | | | WaldenL@TechSoftInc.com | | | http://www.TechSoftInc.com | | | | | | | | | | | | -----Original Message----- | | | From: jt [mailto:jt@ee.net] | | | Sent: Sunday, December 16, 2001 14:17 | | | To: midrange-l@midrange.com | | | Subject: RE: Where are all of the /400's going. (was RE: QUSER on | | | ODBC | | | requests) | | | | | | | | | Walden, | | | | | | Sounds like a keeper, to me... Thanks...! | | | | | | I would add processor serial number to the criteria to validate, at | | | least amongst 400s and other platforms that support this. (Intel | | | could have, but was required by the user community to allow this | | | feature to be disabled at the user's option.) | | | | | | | | | But I'd like to take this to the next level... (Again, don't know | | | the | | | technology.) I'd like to know more about the issues surrounding "Can | | | it be defeated, of course..."... | | | | | | I think a part of the answer to this is collaboration amongst | | | trusted users... Don't know any specifics, but it would seem that | | | different methods of security should be rotated, and continually | | | evolved, to give the hackers a moving target. Spread the security | | | methods around, along the | | lines that | | | the DNS addresses are spread through the Net (although at a MUCH | | | quicker rate). | | | | | | | | | My question is whether it's possible (theoretically AND | | | practically) to keep | | | the security methods evolving fast enough to **simulate** staying | | | one step ahead of the hackers...?!? (You'll always have a small | | | minority of crooked insiders, so you can only "simulate" staying | | | ahead of the hackers, AFAIK.) | | | | | | | | | j "outta here for now!" t | | | | | | | | | | | | | -----Original Message----- | | | | From: midrange-l-admin@midrange.com | | | | [mailto:midrange-l-admin@midrange.com]On Behalf Of Walden H. | | | | Leverich | | | | Sent: Sunday, December 16, 2001 2:01 PM | | | | To: 'midrange-l@midrange.com' | | | | Subject: RE: QUSER on ODBC requests | | | | | | | | | | | | OK, so have the pc program ask the as/400 for a valid userid and | | | | password. The 400 could validate that the request was valid | | | | (remote ip, MAC, time, | | | | etc.) and return a user and password. A 5 second counter would | | | then start | | | | and when it expires the password for that user would be | | | changed. Can it be | | | | defeated, of course, but you'd have to set your ip, mac address | | | | and ask for the password at the specific date and time that's much | | | | more | | | secure than a | | | | user called 'transfer' with a password of 'transfer'. | | | | | | | | -Walden | | | | | | | | | | | | ------------ | | | | Walden H Leverich III | | | | President | | | | Tech Software | | | | (516)627-3800 x11 | | | | WaldenL@TechSoftInc.com | | | | http://www.TechSoftInc.com | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | -----Original Message----- | | | | From: jt [mailto:jt@ee.net] | | | | Sent: Friday, December 14, 2001 14:19 | | | | To: midrange-l@midrange.com | | | | Subject: RE: QUSER on ODBC requests | | | | | | | | | | | | Rob, | | | | | | | | I'd sure like to see an acceptable solution to this one, myself... | | | | | | | | Hardcode passwords in code..: no good at all...! But have | | | | password keyed in on every batch FTP and Domino app use...: AIN'T | | | | GONNA HAPPEN...! | | | | | | | | | | <huge snip of prior messages> | | | | | | _______________________________________________ | | | This is the Midrange Systems Technical Discussion (MIDRANGE-L) | | | mailing list To post a message email: MIDRANGE-L@midrange.com To | | | subscribe, unsubscribe, or change list options, | | | visit: http://lists.midrange.com/cgi-bin/listinfo/midrange-l | | | or email: MIDRANGE-L-request@midrange.com | | | Before posting, please take a moment to review the archives | | | at http://archive.midrange.com/midrange-l. | | | _______________________________________________ | | | This is the Midrange Systems Technical Discussion (MIDRANGE-L) | | | mailing list | | | To post a message email: MIDRANGE-L@midrange.com | | | To subscribe, unsubscribe, or change list options, | | | visit: http://lists.midrange.com/cgi-bin/listinfo/midrange-l | | | or email: MIDRANGE-L-request@midrange.com | | | Before posting, please take a moment to review the archives | | | at http://archive.midrange.com/midrange-l. | | | | | | | _______________________________________________ | | This is the Midrange Systems Technical Discussion (MIDRANGE-L) | | mailing list | | To post a message email: MIDRANGE-L@midrange.com | | To subscribe, unsubscribe, or change list options, | | visit: http://lists.midrange.com/cgi-bin/listinfo/midrange-l | | or email: MIDRANGE-L-request@midrange.com | | Before posting, please take a moment to review the archives | | at http://archive.midrange.com/midrange-l. | | _______________________________________________ | | This is the Midrange Systems Technical Discussion (MIDRANGE-L) | | mailing list | | To post a message email: MIDRANGE-L@midrange.com | | To subscribe, unsubscribe, or change list options, | | visit: http://lists.midrange.com/cgi-bin/listinfo/midrange-l | | or email: MIDRANGE-L-request@midrange.com | | Before posting, please take a moment to review the archives | | at http://archive.midrange.com/midrange-l. | | | | _______________________________________________ | This is the Midrange Systems Technical Discussion (MIDRANGE-L) | mailing list | To post a message email: MIDRANGE-L@midrange.com | To subscribe, unsubscribe, or change list options, | visit: http://lists.midrange.com/cgi-bin/listinfo/midrange-l | or email: MIDRANGE-L-request@midrange.com | Before posting, please take a moment to review the archives | at http://archive.midrange.com/midrange-l. | _______________________________________________ | This is the Midrange Systems Technical Discussion (MIDRANGE-L) | mailing list | To post a message email: MIDRANGE-L@midrange.com | To subscribe, unsubscribe, or change list options, | visit: http://lists.midrange.com/cgi-bin/listinfo/midrange-l | or email: MIDRANGE-L-request@midrange.com | Before posting, please take a moment to review the archives | at http://archive.midrange.com/midrange-l. |
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