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Bruce, > I don't understand why having password limiting system values would > lead to the conclusion that the method of encryption is not strong. > Could you expand on this? Sure. There are, as you know, a number of system values that limit what you can choose as a password. Most of them (such as QPWDLMTREP to limit repeating characters) can be supported by just checking the clear text version of the password before it's encrypted, and are trivial to implement in code. The system value in questioning the encryption strength is QPWDPOSDIF. This sysval stops you from changing your password from ABC1 to ABC2, because the ABC are still in the same place. One of the things that makes an encryption algorithm strong is the ability to hide the 'positional information' about the text being encrypted, because if your encrypted strings for ABC1 & ABC2 end up, for example as C1C2C3F1 and C1C2C3F2, then it makes it very simple (simple in relative terms in cryptology) to determine/reverse the encryption algorithm hence my point that the encryption method cannot be very strong (again, strong in cryptology terms). My point being that if IBM is saying there is no way to decrypt the password then the encrypted password must be 'showing' the positional information for the code to determine the positions of the characters in the old password verses the new password. Encryption algorithms such as, say, Blowfish do leave the 'positional information' in the encrypted form, and dependent upon the size of the key used are breakable. I, personally have nothing to fear from the AS/400 encryption method being cracked in the near future, for a number of reasons; 1. Nobody knows what method IBM is using - although it seems to be machine independent i.e. nothing seems to be used from the machine to encrypt the passwords. 2. Encrypted passwords on the AS/400 use aprox. 2000 bytes of storage for the 10 characters of clear text you enter for your password 3. The object protection for programs makes it very difficult to run anything (any user written code) that can be used to help, unless you've got a high authority user ID all ready - in that case there is a bigger security hole ! --phil +--- | This is the Midrange System Mailing List! | To submit a new message, send your mail to MIDRANGE-L@midrange.com. | To subscribe to this list send email to MIDRANGE-L-SUB@midrange.com. | To unsubscribe from this list send email to MIDRANGE-L-UNSUB@midrange.com. | Questions should be directed to the list owner/operator: david@midrange.com +---
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