Fwd: Creating Bin Laden

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Yhis is a LONG article.
I will comment on it in a separate post later.

MacWheel99@aol.com (Alister Wm Macintyre) (Al Mac)


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Date: Sat, 15 Sep 2001 21:01:50 -0000
From: MacWheel99@aol.com
To: MacWheel99@aol.com
Subject: Fwd:  FRONTLINE Interview with Dr. Saad Al-Fagih
User-Agent: eGroups-EW/0.82

--- In TYR@y..., Jim Torson <j.torson@c...> wrote:

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EDITOR'S COMMENT:
Here's a very interesting interview that discusses Osama bin Laden in
depth.
It's long, but well worth reading if you would like to have a better
understanding of who bin Laden is, what his motivations are, how he is
viewed in the Arab world, and what he has done with his life. I found
the
reference to him receiving a prophetic vision of Iraq's invasion of
Kuwait
to be particularly interesting. I also took note of another incident
mentioned in a story published by The Independent: "Is The World's
Favorite
Hate Figure To Blame?"
(http://news.independent.co.uk/world/middle_east/story.jsp?
storyÙ3624).
That article mentioned that bin Laden had a religious experience
during the
Afghan war when a Russian shell fell at his feet and failed to
explode.
Are these stories true, false, or a combination of truth and falsehood
designed to bolster bin Laden's messianic image?
Thanks to Tom Atlee.
--- David Sunfellow
------------
FRONTLINE INTERVIEW WITH DR. SAAD AL-FAGIH
Originally Aired 4/13/1999
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/binladen/interviews/al-
fagih.h
tml#alqaeda
[A Saudi Arabian dissident living in Exile in London, Dr. Saad Al-
Fagih
heads the Movement for Islamic Reform in Arabia. As a physician, he
took
part in the Afghan rebels' war against the Soviet invasion and
explains the
significance of that war for Muslim's throughout the world. As a
fellow
Saudi dissident, he knows about bin Laden and his views.]

FRONTLINE: When they think of Saudi Arabia in the United States, we
think of
oil, rich sheiks driving Mercedes ... . But it's a country that's
actually
in crisis. Is that right?
DR. SAAD AL-FAGIH: That's right. During the last 20 years there has
been
enough oil, enough money to build high buildings and to buy nice
cars. And
to inject a lot of money into the pockets of those royal family
members.
[But] there has been no power structure or political structure to
maintain a
healthy country. And because of the repeated challenges, we are now
facing
real crisis. ...

FRONTLINE: This is context for us to understand someone like bin
Laden and
where he comes from -- who he is?
DR. SAAD AL-FAGIH: There is a lot ... to explain why did bin Laden
emerge.
One of the main [two] factors for the emergence of the phenomena of
bin
Laden is the circumstances in Saudi Arabia. With the pathological
rule of
the royal family in a country like Saudi Arabia. But there's the other
factor which is very important. ... [you're] creating the picture of
America
in the eyes of Muslims as [an] arrogant, hostile country to Muslim
causes.
Because of those two factors together, you would not be surprised to
see a
phenomena like bin Laden. I would see bin Laden as ... a product of
the
circumstances.

FRONTLINE: So bin Laden is not just a terrorist or just an operative
out
there. He's part of a social movement.
DR. SAAD AL-FAGIH: That's right. He's a product of a new social
structure. A
new social feeling in the Muslim world. Where you have strong
hostility not
only against America, but also against many Arab and Muslim regimes
who are
allying to America. ... And that's why if bin Laden was not there,
you would
have another bin Laden. You would have another name, with the same
character, with the same role, of bin Laden now. That's why we call it
phenomena not a person.

FRONTLINE: The phenomenon is based on the fact of a revival of
religious
feeling and religious values amongst the people?
DR. SAAD AL-FAGIH: That's one side of it. All philosophers agree that
there
has been a revival... [of] the roles of Islam ... in the Muslim world
in the
last 20 years. ...
Nobody argues with that fact. But there's also a new phenomenon that
is
increased hostility of Muslims against America. Not only Arab
Muslims. Also
non-Arab Muslims who believe America is the reason for many problems
in the
Muslim world. ... [Americans] are consistent on absolute, severe
embargo on
Iraqi people. Not directed against the regime. But directed against
the
people themselves. Because the regime's not suffering from the
embargo.
Support of Israel -- unlimited, unconditional support of Israel.
Insistence
on keeping actual military power inside the holy land -- inside
Arabia,
which is something which has not happened in the last 1,400 years of
Islamic
history. Those things are [an] irritant to Muslims.

FRONTLINE: It's an irritant to you.
DR. SAAD AL-FAGIH: It's irritant to everybody. Not only Islamists in
Arabia.
... Even in liberals in the Saudi Arabia are against American military
presence in Arabia. So even if you are a non-observing Muslim, you
feel
angry. ...

FRONTLINE: So while we in the United States would see the presence of
our
military in the Middle East or in Saudi Arabia in particular as an
act of
generosity on our part -- to help defend you and defend you country --
 you
see it as an occupation.
DR. SAAD AL-FAGIH: Exactly. That is the controversy. That's the
contradiction between the two views. ... The Americans [have] to
understand
the mentality of people there. They have to correct this view.
There's no
way to convince people that this is generosity to defend the
country. ... So
this view has to be corrected in the minds of Americans.

FRONTLINE: You say this view has to be corrected in the minds of
Americans.
You've been to the United States. Many Americans would say, "Why
should I
care about this? What difference does it make to me?"
DR. SAAD AL-FAGIH: Well, if you have this feeling converted into a
violent
feeling, he has to care about this. If that feeling produces somebody
like
bin Laden or others who believe that they have to fight the
Americans -- or
have to fight the regimes which allow the Americans to stay -- then
you have
to care for it. There is going to be death. ... And this is a reason
for
every American to care about it because it is producing bad
incidents. It's
better to deal with it peacefully, [in] a nice sensible way. You
say, "Okay,
this is your country. You don't want our military to stay there. We'll
leave." ... The other option is to keep the forces until ... the
resentment
and irritation goes to the degree that everybody is fighting the
Americans.
...

FRONTLINE: To be mercenary about it, many people in America might
say, "You
know what we're really there for? We're defending our oil."
DR. SAAD AL-FAGIH: That's what we believe. The military people there
are
defending the oil, which is believed by Americans to be American oil.
Not
Arab oil. And that's the most sincere and credible expression by [an
average] American. That they see this as American oil. And they are
going
there to buy the land and control the oil. And that's what irritates
us.
That they believe that this is their territory. This is their
resources. And
this is their domain. ... What about us? This is our country. This is
our
land. ... Not another country has the [right to come] here and
say, "Stay
aside, we'll control the oil."

FRONTLINE: So bin Laden is seen as someone fighting for the dignity,
the
natural resources, the nation of Saudi Arabia?
DR. SAAD AL-FAGIH: Very much so. He is going even beyond that.
Because of
the American challenge to Arabians and Muslims, to the degree that
they are
controlling their own resources, he's going beyond that. ... He wants
Muslims to have domination in the whole area. ... So Muslim [economy]
has to
replace an American [economy]. That's the principles of bin Laden and
people
like bin Laden. ...

FRONTLINE: Now, you're from a prominent family in Saudi Arabia. So is
bin
Laden. ... He's part of a large prominent family. Who are the bin
Ladens?
DR. SAAD AL-FAGIH: The bin Laden family is very interesting. His
father came
from a family from Hadramout, South Yemen, who are famous to be
successful
merchants and business men. ... His father came to Jeddah and worked
[as] a
laborer ... and in three years he become one of the biggest
constructors in
the country. A millionaire. His [most] successful move [was when he
convinced] King Saud in the late 50s or early 60s to take over the
bid to
build one or two of his palaces. ... And since then, he was the
constructor
[of the royal family]. He was the constructor of the whole country,
indeed.
He had another [good] move when he succeeded in having alliances
between
King Faisal and King Saud ... he was among the few people who
succeeded in
convincing King Saud to leave and let the country end up with King
Faisal in
charge. And King Faisal issued a decree that every contractor has to
end up
with bin Laden, the father. ... And when King Faisal died, he left a
will to
his brothers to look after bin Laden's sons. Because by that time bin
Laden
has died also. ...

FRONTLINE: And amongst these sons is Osama bin Laden?
DR. SAAD AL-FAGIH: And among those sons was Osama bin Laden.

FRONTLINE: And he's a contemporary of yours?
DR. SAAD AL-FAGIH: He's a contemporary of our generation. Yes.

FRONTLINE: Tell me about him. He was raised primarily by his brothers?
DR. SAAD AL-FAGIH: Well, in his first 13 years of life, his father was
there. ... And is father had a very strong personality, and he kept
[tough
discipline] with his brothers. They had to meet every day in their
father's
house. They have to have at least one or two meals together. And their
father forced them to keep absolutely good relations with each other.
[Absolute] respect in the family. And was brought up with good
manners as
observing Muslim. And then when his father died, he was...

FRONTLINE: A fundamentalist Muslim?
DR. SAAD AL-FAGIH: No. He was just an average Muslim. An average
observing
Muslim. ... The problem with "fundamentalist" is a problem of
definition.
Most of the western audience associates fundamentalists with
violence, with
being extremist, with being off the main trend [of] society. If that
is the
definition of fundamentalist, no. He was not like that. If we are
talking
about an observing Muslim, we are talking about a Muslim who observes
the
basic [tenets] of Islam. That the goes to the mosque. He looks after
his
parents. He runs his family properly ... similar to the ten
commandments in
other religions. ...

FRONTLINE: As a person, we're told that bin Laden is a large person.
Physically large person.
DR. SAAD AL-FAGIH: [Slightly] taller than average. But not large.
He's tall
and [very thin].

FRONTLINE: Humble?
DR. SAAD AL-FAGIH: Well in his desert life, he's very humble. Very
simple.
And people who work with him or live with him like him a lot. Because
he's
having the two characters for people to be liked. The charisma, the
aura on
one side. And also the humbleness and being simple and being generous
and
soft on the other side. So if you, if you have the aura and charisma,
in
[addition] to being very simple and very humble, you force people to
respect
you and like you. ... I did not have the chance to see him or talk to
him
directly, [but] the people who lived with him very closely, they told
me
that you are taken by his personality. And you are forced to have
strong
affection towards him. And respect.

FRONTLINE: Some people told us in the 1970s, he was lost. He wasn't
really
focused. He didn't really have a career or direction until he went to
Afghanistan. Until he got attracted by the jihad.
DR. SAAD AL-FAGIH: Exactly. He was not known. [He] was just one
brother
among 50 brothers of the bin Laden family. He was just a student in
the
university. And then he was taken by the news of Afghanistan and he
moved
there. Even the first three or four years in Afghanistan, nobody
noticed
that he was there. Only when he encouraged people to go and join him
there.
Then he became a hero and a symbol or sacrifice. ...

FRONTLINE: What did he [do there]?
DR. SAAD AL-FAGIH: He went there by his own first. And then he ...
went back
to [Saudi Arabia] and brought his construction equipment into
Afghanistan.
And he built roads and trenches and other things. He even [built] some
training camps inside Afghanistan. And made them a base for the Arabs
who
wanted to join [the] jihad [in] Afghanistan. That was in the middle
80s.

FRONTLINE: We're told by some former CIA people who were in
Afghanistan that
he really wasn't involved in any of the fighting. That he wasn't
really a
fighter in Afghanistan.
DR. SAAD AL-FAGIH: That's not true. He was involved ... in fighting in
Afghanistan. In the beginning, he ... join[ed] ... under the banner
of the
Afghan factions. And then he thought he can have his own camp and his
own
establishment inside Afghanistan. And he built one or two guest
houses in
Peshawar, with three or four camps inside Afghanistan. That was a
complex.
This complex was known to be ... used only by Arabs who are coming
from
Saudi Arabia, Kuwait ... Algeria, Egypt, Yemen. [Seventy or 80
percent are
from] Saudi Arabia. And only 20 percent are from all other countries.
So the
best estimates are that you had between 30 to 40 thousand people who
have
been through this complex, either having training or joining battle
themselves. Now he ran at least five or six battles. Heavy battles
with the
Soviet Union. Direct battles. Apart from the battles which he attended
[with] the Afghan factions. And more than once he was almost killed by
artillery or by rocket attacks from the Soviet side. ...

FRONTLINE: What was the attraction to the jihad in Afghanistan? You
went to
Afghanistan, right?
DR. SAAD AL-FAGIH: Well, I went there as a doctor, as a surgeon. ...
For
somebody like bin Laden, the strongest attraction, the strongest
reason for
his movement is religious. He's feeling a religious duty to join his
brother
Muslims there. And to contribute in the defense of their land against
the
oppressor. ... But also for him and many of other Saudis it was a
golden
opportunity to live the life of jihad. Because you could not practice
jihad
in Saudi Arabia. You cannot practice jihad in the Gulf. You cannot
practice
jihad in ... any other country. So the one way to practice actual
jihad in
its full scale sense -- you carry a weapon and fight the enemy -- was
Afghanistan.

FRONTLINE: What do you mean, practice jihad?
DR. SAAD AL-FAGIH: Well, I mean, jihad has many scales. The simplest
scale
is to fight yourself and prevent it from committing sin. And the [full
scale] jihad is to be in an army or a group fighting the enemy of
Islam.
Actual battle. Actual military conflict. You fight and have the
chance of
being killed or being injured. And that's what people were eager to
live.
... And one of the first people to respond this message, to this
call, was
bin Laden. Not only by his own body -- by fighting. But by his money.
By his
reputation. By his influence. And by his relations. So he was there --
moving from Saudi Arabia with all those advantages -- to Afghanistan
and
donating himself. Donating his money. Donating his reputation.
Donating his
history and family relations to the jihad.

FRONTLINE: Jihad, a word that we hear many times in the media of the
United
States -- jihad means integrating your ethical, moral and actual
political
and physical life all together in the pursuit of the perfect life? The
perfect end?
DR. SAAD AL-FAGIH: Well, that's the wider definition of it. But you
have to
have the narrower definition of jihad. Which is the military
definition of
jihad. And that is to carry weapons and to stay in the battle field
and
fight the enemy of Islam. And that's the thing which was missing. You
can
practice all sorts of moral, intellectual jihad ... . But you cannot
practice military jihad. And it is a religious obligation to find
some sort
of opportunity to prepare yourself and to contribute some sort of
military
jihad that's in Islam. ...

FRONTLINE: So the Afghan war was something like a popular revolution
that
people from all over Islam could come to. Then wind up taking the
story or
the energy of it back to their homeland?
DR. SAAD AL-FAGIH: Exactly. That's a good description. It was a
chance for
people who have been brought up as Muslims ... to meet their Islamic
obligations, including jihad in its military form. ... It was a window
created by the Soviet Union and by America for Muslims to live this
sort of
life.

FRONTLINE: In a way it was the cold war opening up a new world of
struggle?
DR. SAAD AL-FAGIH: In a way it was the cold war opening, a camp for
Muslims
to train and prepare for the new life. For [the] new world order, as
they
call it.

FRONTLINE: A new world order we may not be too happy about in the
west.
DR. SAAD AL-FAGIH: Well, we call it a new world disorder. ...

FRONTLINE: You, yourself, went to the front.
DR. SAAD AL-FAGIH: Well, I went to Peshawar to work in a hospital as a
surgeon, but I don't call myself as going to the front. But I was
shown. I
was taken by a team ... to see what is going on [with] the structure
of some
of some camps. ...

FRONTLINE: The structure you saw -- the guest houses, camps -- what
was
constructed by bin Laden and his organization, right?
DR. SAAD AL-FAGIH: Yes. Well I mean, the guest house was probably
just a
house in Peshawar ... an average house ... .

FRONTLINE: But there's some confusion here apparently. Today in the
United
States, we hear from law enforcement about Al Qaeda.
DR. SAAD AL-FAGIH: Yes.

FRONTLINE: But to you that's something different.
DR. SAAD AL-FAGIH: Well, I [really] laugh when I hear the FBI talking
about
Al Qaeda as an organization of bin Laden. ... [It's really a] very
simple
story. If bin Laden is to receive Arabs from Saudi Arabia and from
Kuwait --
from other regions -- he is [to] receive them in the guest house in
Peshawar. They used to go to the battle field and come back, without
documentation.

FRONTLINE: What do you mean without documentation?
DR. SAAD AL-FAGIH: There [was] no documentation of who has arrived.
Who has
left. How long he stayed. There's only [a nice general reception].
And you
go there. And you join in the battle field. ... Very simple
organization.
Now, he was embarrassed by many families when they called him and ask
what
happened to our son. He don't know. `Cause there's no record. There's
no
documentation. Now he asked some of his colleagues to start
documenting the
movement of every Arab coming under his umbrella. ... It is recorded
that
[they] arrived in this date and stayed in this house. ... And then
there was
a record of thousands and thousands of people. Many of them had come
only
for two weeks, three weeks and then disappeared. That record, that
documentation was called the record of Al Qaeda. So that was Al Qaeda.
There's nothing sinister about Al Qaeda. It's not like an
organization --
like any other terrorist organization or any other underground group.
I
don't think he used any name for his underground group. If you want
to name
it, you can name it "bin Laden group." But if they are using the term
Al
Qaeda ... Al Qaeda is just a record for the people who came to
Peshawar and
moved from there back and forth to the guest house. And moved back to
their
country. And if they want to follow the number, they must be talking
about
20, 30 thousand people. Which is impossible to trace. And I think
most of
those records are in the hands of the Saudi government anyway, because
people used the Saudi airlines, [at] a very much reduced fare. Twenty-
five
percent of the total fare of a trip to Islamabad. ...

FRONTLINE: So Al Qaeda ... [is] not a secret organization at all, is
it?
DR. SAAD AL-FAGIH: It's not a secret organization at all. It was
common
knowledge to many people who went there. ... Al Qaeda was public
knowledge.
It was a record of people who ended up in Peshawar and joined, and
move from
Peshawar to Afghanistan. It was very [benign] information. A simple
record
of people who were there just to make record available to bin Laden
if he's
asked by any family or any friend what happened to Mr. so-and-so.

FRONTLINE: And most have now returned to their homes?
DR. SAAD AL-FAGIH: Yes. Most of them is, are back. Now if they want
to talk
about the bulk or the core of bin Laden followers, I don't think
there is
any name of that group. You can very correctly and very accurately
describe
it as "bin Laden group." Full stop. As a small core, probably a few
hundred
of people who are around bin Laden. And the bulk of those are in four
countries. Afghanistan. Saudi Arabia. Yemen. And Somalia. Very, very
few or
probably none in other countries. ...

FRONTLINE: I take it that the description that's given by US law
enforcement
of a well organized cell organization in the bin Laden organization,
is not
really the case -- from what you're saying. That it's really very
diffused
and disorganized in some ways.
DR. SAAD AL-FAGIH: Well, there's a mixture. Bin Laden does have a
small core
of followers who are unlikely to be anywhere but in Afghanistan and
Yemen.
Probably a good number in Saudi Arabia and a good number in Somalia.
And
then you have the [wider group]. In thousands, maybe tens of
thousands, who
are sympathetic to bin Laden and who look at him as their father, and
arrange themselves in small groups here and there. A very loose
network with
that hierarchy. You can never eradicate them. ... Each small group
has its
own chain of command, its own logistics. Now they wait for somebody
like bin
Laden to give them moral support and give them directions. They might
try to
contact him to get advice from him. But they don't belong to him like
a
special organization with a pyramidal structure or anything like
that. He
does have a small core of followers probably in the hundreds. But
some ...
have estimated the number to be 600 or 700. But the danger for the
west or
for Saudi Arabians -- for the regime in Saudi Arabia -- is not only
this 600
people. The danger lies with all those small groups. Which probably,
the
people who did [the] Khobar and Riyadh [bombings] were among them.
They just
planned the purchase themselves. They went to bin Laden. They took his
encouragement and his sanctioning. And they did it. But they don't
belong to
his close core of followers.

FRONTLINE: So what you're saying is that even if the FBI and CIA were
extremely efficient and rounded up the individuals who did the
bombing in
Nairobi, there will be no end to this problem until the underlying
issues
are dealt with?
DR. SAAD AL-FAGIH: Exactly. No end at all. The only solution to the
bin
Laden problem for the Americans is to understand it as phenomena. Not
as a
single terrorist who is staying there, sending one or two of his
followers
to have an explosion here or to have a bomb there. They have to
understand
the problem as phenomena. And they have to deal with its grass roots.
They
cannot deal with the problem of Muslims versus America. But they can
at
least reduce the huge resentment in Saudi Arabia by reducing the
tension
against him by moving the military presence from Arabia. And also by
pressing the regime to be more open, have more [power] sharing, more
freedom
of expression and more freedom of assembly in Saudi Arabia. And they
have to
prove to the people [that it is their effort] which forced the Saudi
regime
to be more friendly to [its nation]. Otherwise they will lose the
battle I
believe. ...

FRONTLINE: The only answer then is to back real reform in Saudi
Arabia?
DR. SAAD AL-FAGIH: That is the biggest hope. But people probably would
accept much less. Would accept at least to remove their forces and
just stop
backing the regime in Saudi Arabia. ...

FRONTLINE: There's a story that [after his return from Afghanistan]
bin
Laden begins to turn his attention from the Soviet Union towards the
government of Saudi Arabia and the United States. Because he goes to
the
government of Saudi Arabia in 1989 and says, "Watch out. You're going
to be
invaded by Saddam. And I'm prepared to organize your defense." Tell
me about
that.
DR. SAAD AL-FAGIH: That's a very credible story. When he came back to
Saudi
Arabia in 1989 after the withdrawal of Soviet troops, he was
prohibited from
leaving Saudi Arabia. And he thought he might spend some time in his
country
thinking or considering what to do to his country. ... And he had a
prophecy
that Saddam's going to invade Saudi Arabia. And he made this public.
Not
only through secret confidential letters to the king, but he was
talking
about it in the mosques. He was giving speeches in the mosques and
talking
about the danger of Ba'ath -- which is a party of Saddam -- having
ambitions
to invade Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. ... And then his prophecy was
correct.
And he was never respected or rewarded for that. Instead he was
advised to
stay in Jeddah; he was put in sort of house arrest.

FRONTLINE: At this point, the government is becoming suspicious of
him or
nervous about him?
DR. SAAD AL-FAGIH: The government started to become very suspicious
about
him. Because they don't want anybody to think. ... He was thinking,
he was
thinking loud and high. ... And he made his thoughts public as well
as in a
document to the regime. ... So they were weary about him. They were
suspicious. This man is becoming too ambitious ... . So [they] try to
corner
him. Try to contain him.
Now he went further. After the Iraqi invasion, he was still sort of
in their
[good graces] when he suggested to bring all his supporters and
defend the
country under his command. And he made all the [guarantees] that his
supporters would not give you a hard time. They would just defend the
country against the invading Iraqi army. And he said, "You don't need
Americans. You don't need any other non-Muslim troops. We will be
enough.
And I can convince even Afghanis to come and join us instead of
Americans."
And then the Saudis become even more furious. ... We have to contain
him
more. And instead of asking him to limit his movements ... he was
asked to
stay [under] real house arrest.

FRONTLINE: In his mind, he also sees the United States as supporting
this
regime that doesn't allow you to think.
DR. SAAD AL-FAGIH: Well, because he was wary about America from the
start
and because he was looking at America as in alliance with [the House
of
Saud] family to loot the country's resources and to suppress Islam in
that
part of the world, he was already full of hatred to Americans. But he
needed
another act to completely change his thinking. And that was the actual
presence of American military ... in Saudi Arabia. He was still
controlling
his thoughts and words at that stage. Now when Americans landed with
their
forces in Arabia, his mind changed completely. He lost hope
altogether with
the regime. And he regarded the country from that moment as
occupied. ...

FRONTLINE: He moves to go back to Pakistan and then Afghanistan,
using his
brothers' influence to get free.
DR. SAAD AL-FAGIH: Yes. He was able to, let's say, to fool the regime
by
claiming that he wants to finish his little bit of business in
Pakistan and
[come back to] the country. So he left the country forever. So he
went to
Pakistan and tried to sort the differences in the [Afghani] factions.

FRONTLINE: He got involved as a mediator.
DR. SAAD AL-FAGIH: He was working as a mediator, yes. And he was
actually
working against ... [the] Saudi intelligence, who [were] actually
[trying
to] increasing the gap between the Afghani factions to keep them
fighting.
And he was doing the opposite. Unfortunately, the work of [the Saudi
intelligence] succeeded. And the work of bin Laden failed. So he was
forced
to leave Afghanistan. He was about to be assassinated in that stage.
And he
left to Sudan.

FRONTLINE: People wanted to assassinate bin Laden?
DR. SAAD AL-FAGIH: By Saudi intelligence ... . I think when the Saudis
discovered that he fooled them, that he has no intention to go back
to the
country, they were aware that this man is dangerous for the future.
Not
dangerous to America. But dangerous to them. Because the Saudis do not
accept anybody who has [followers] to be free ... . If you are a man
with
influence and you are "Saudi," you have to stay in the country and
you have
to be under control. ... So when they discovered that he fooled them
and he
is going to do something which is unprotectable against them, they
said the
best way to save ourselves in the future is to kill him now... He
went to
Sudan. ...

FRONTLINE: Why did he go to Sudan?
DR. SAAD AL-FAGIH: At that time, the Sudan government was raising an
Islamic
banner and was making it easy for any Muslim or any Arab to come
without
visa. ... It was easy for him to go there. ... That was the only
option. He
can't go to Egypt. He cannot go to Yemen. He cannot go to Saudi
Arabia or to
the Gulf. ... He [doesn't] believe in seeking asylum in a non-Muslim
country. ...

FRONTLINE: At some point the Saudis withdraw his citizenship?
DR. SAAD AL-FAGIH: Yes. ...

FRONTLINE: So he's truly a stateless person.
DR. SAAD AL-FAGIH: ... By law, this is was his condition after
canceling his
citizenship there.

FRONTLINE: In a way, his only state is Islam.
DR. SAAD AL-FAGIH: He produced a communiqué saying that ... whether
the
Saudis withdraw [his citizenship] or not, that does not change
anything. I
belong to the holy land. I've been born there. And my family is
there. And I
deserve to be called Muslim and Arab and part of the holy land. ...

FRONTLINE: In 1995, a car bomb blows up in Riyadh killing Americans.
The
Saudis say he's involved.
DR. SAAD AL-FAGIH: Well, the Saudis did not say he's involved. ... I
think
the Saudis don't like to say he's involved because they don't want to
give
him credit ... .

FRONTLINE: How significant was it that there was a bombing in Saudi
Arabia
and Americans were killed?
DR. SAAD AL-FAGIH: Well, very significant in the eye of American and
in the
eyes of the Saudis. ... It was a proof that a man can do what he claim
[s] he
can do. He did it. It was [an] actual incident. There was a bomb.
There was
Americans killed. And then it happened again in Khobar. ... It
happened
twice. So it was very significant. So this man has the role and has
the
eagerness but also has the capacity to do the job. Now, he has not
said that
he is behind [the bombings] a 100 percent. But all the circumstances
lead to
the belief that he is indirectly or directly responsible for those two
incidences.

FRONTLINE: But if it was in the interest of the Saudi regime to stop
this
from happening, why was there such lack of cooperation with the FBI
when
they arrived on the scene to try and find out who did the Khobar
towers
bombing?
DR. SAAD AL-FAGIH: Well, that is very interesting. ... Despite ... the
interest of the Saudis to control bin Laden and to prevent any future
incidents, they don't want the Americans to know anything about the
real
situation of opposition inside Saudi Arabia. Whether it is peaceful
opposition or militant opposition. [House of Saud] wants the
Americans to
have full faith in them as people in charge of that country. They
want the
Americans to see them as the leaders who can guarantee the American
interests [and their future]. ... They will never allow Americans to
know
the actual resentment, actual opposition inside the country. Once the
Americans [receive] this information, they will lose faith in the
[Saudis
and the House of Saud].

FRONTLINE: You say that there would be sympathy because you want to
expel
foreign troops from your land. But ... was a mistake for bin Laden to
declare that Americans or Jews should be killed anywhere in the world?
DR. SAAD AL-FAGIH: Many Muslims see this as not acceptable on two
folds. Not
acceptable Islamically. Because you cannot sanction the blood of any
American or any Jew. You have to have strict conditions to sanction
any
human blood in Islam. And this is not acceptable. [Really any] average
Muslim would argue against that. But there is the other reason for not
accepting, the strategic [reason]. If you want to fight America, you
have to
present an acceptable argument. ... You have an occupied country. And
when
you say, "I want to expel Americans," your argument will be accepted.
When
you say, ..."I want to fight any American in the world," any ...
average
American would have negative feelings against you. Even if he is
Muslim
American sometimes. So that's why people say it is Islamically
questionable
as well as strategically questionable. ...

FRONTLINE: Hasn't the response by the Clinton administration, the
attack on
the pharmaceutical factory and the attack in Afghanistan,
strengthened bin
Laden's hand?
DR. SAAD AL-FAGIH: Very much so. ... Americans cannot imagine how
much ...
strength have Americans injected into bin Laden's position by
attacking
Afghanistan and attacking this medical factory in Sudan. And then
Clinton
standing in a press conference and talking about bin Laden ... .
After this
attack, people were talking about bin Laden as a super power against
America. ... That's the best gift can be given from the Americans to
bin
Laden. Or from Bill Clinton to bin Laden.

FRONTLINE:... So, in many ways, Bill Clinton played into bin Laden's
hand by
retaliating in the way he did. And actually played into your hands
too.
DR. SAAD AL-FAGIH: Well, very much so. Before the American strike --
that's
after the Kenya and Tanzania bombing -- there was some controversy
whether
bin Laden was right or wrong. Or whether he did it or he did not. Now
after
the American strike on Afghanistan and Sudan, that controversy was
[sorted
out]. People forgot Kenya and Tanzania, whether he did it or not. I
think
people know now that bin Laden's at the [keel]. And he's the man who
can
meet the expectations of many Muslims for a man who can irritate and
drive
America crazy. That is -- the only man who did it was bin Laden. And
he
forced Clinton to stand up and mention his name three times. ...

FRONTLINE: To people in the United States -- is it really appropriate
to
blow up buildings and kill innocent people because of your
frustrations with
policy in Saudi Arabia?
DR. SAAD AL-FAGIH: There are many people who don't like that, of
course.
They don't see this as [properly at all justified] ... Neither
justified in
religion nor justified in common sense. But ... [the] bombing of
Afghanistan
and Sudan has made people forget this controversy and consider why
America
would hate Afghanistan and Sudan. ... You can very easily question
this
justification of American's hitting the medical factory.

FRONTLINE: But what if it's just stupidity on the Americans part?
DR. SAAD AL-FAGIH: Well, people don't look at it is as stupidity.
People
look at it as arrogance ... . "If it is Muslim casualties, we don't
care.
Let hundreds, tens of people die. We don't care. If it is [non-
Muslims],
then we will think twice before doing that." That's what people
[appreciate]. They don't see it as stupidity by Americans. ...

FRONTLINE: In bin Laden's story, how important is the money from his
family?
DR. SAAD AL-FAGIH: There's a very interesting thing in [Islamic]
structure
of the family. You are obliged to support your family members. Even
if they
are distant members. If it's a cousin or a niece or a nephew, you
have to
support them if you are a capable person. ... And the [people] feel
sinful
if they don't let this money ... go to its real owner which is Osama
bin
Laden. ...

FRONTLINE: Even though we've been told that the bin Laden family has
cut him
off?
DR. SAAD AL-FAGIH: Well, they have to say that publicly. They have to
try to
pretend to be cutting off bin Laden. But in actuality they admire
him, they
respect him. ... I don't claim that all ... the brothers do that. But
quite
a significant number of them work hard to get [rid of what they see
as]
sinful money -- has to reach its real owner.
It's not only the bin Laden family who's supporting him. Bin Laden
has never
relied on his own money or his family's money to survive or to
support his
cause. Many rich Muslims believe that the best way to serve jihad
through
money is through bin Laden himself. ... It's fairly difficult now
[for] an
average Muslim businessman or a [very] rich Muslim to let the money
reach
bin Laden. But that's happening. ... You can never destroy bin Laden's
assets by just confiscating what is in his name. Or trying to trace
his
money movement in the banks here and there. You cannot control him by
those
means. ...

FRONTLINE: [But] part of the story of bin Laden in the United States
is that
he has 250 million dollars, and he's kind of like the John D.
Rockefeller of
terrorism.
DR. SAAD AL-FAGIH: I read a few reports on the American press about
bin
Laden's financial assets and the way Americans are trying to ...
trace them
... using satellites and Internet. It made me laugh a lot. Because I
know
there is none of that. Bin Laden does not use banks I was told. But
bin
Laden, in his personal capacity, is supposed to be bankrupt now. He
had
three massive setbacks in his financial story. ... First there was the
freezing of all his assets ... around 250, 300 million dollars. It's
inside
Saudi Arabia and it is part of his share in the company. It is under
the
microscope of the Saudi regime. It can't go here or there. ... And
then he
had a big loss in Sudan. Because he volunteered to do one of two
projects
[for] the Sudanese. The big road -- they call it the challenge road.
And he
spent something like 250 or 300 million dollars on that project.
Assuming
that the Sudanese would pay him at one time, but they ... paid him
hardly 10
or 20 million. So in practicality, he lost all this money. And then
came the
last, the set back. When this man [Sidi Tayyib] defected to the Saudi
regime. And he knew quite a bit about his remaining small companies
here and
there. And he told the Saudis about them. Now he knew that his man
would
defect. So he prepared himself by selling those companies with, with
significant loss before the defection of [Sidi Tayyib] ... .

FRONTLINE: Why does he survive now?
DR. SAAD AL-FAGIH: Well, he survives for two reasons. Number one,
there is
some other source, other than his own money, ... his indirect family
support
and rich Muslims supporting him to support jihad. And the other
reason that
he survives is that neither he nor his followers need money. They are
living
a very, very simple life. And for their operations, they don't need a
lot of
money. You can buy a [rocket propelled grenade] in Yemen for cheaper
than
foreign audio tape recorders. You can you can buy TNT in Somalia
cheaper
than sugar. So explosives are not that expensive and the [people] have
already been trained. And the logistics needed are very little. And
people
are volunteers. They are not paid. They are not mercenaries. So the
cost of
a big operation like bombing Riyadh or bombing Khobar could come to a
few
thousand dollars. Very easily. ...

FRONTLINE: I have one final question. Does the average American
tourist have
reason to fear? ... Secondly, does the average American worker in an
office
in New York or Washington have reason to fear?
DR. SAAD AL-FAGIH: Well, you still have to fear from the 600 militia
in
America who have more power and more influence in America. ... The
chance of
having a terrorist attack by thousands of militia in America is
probably one
thousand times the chance of bin Laden in America. ... Of course
there is a
small risk of bin Laden doing something. He still has followers. He
still
has the motivation. He can do it in America or outside America. His
group of
followers, whether it is a small group or the big group, can never be
eradicated. So there's still the potential of some sort of danger.
But it's
not logical to say, "Oh, the danger only comes from those." There's a
danger
coming from everywhere.
Regarding the Muslim world, there is a problem in [each] country,
which has
nothing to do with bin Laden. Like [in] Egypt. There are many militant
groups who want to fight the regime, who want to embarrass the regime
by
fighting tourists. They have no relation to bin Laden. ... They are
not
motivated by bin Laden. ... The risk is there. But it is not fair to
say the
problem is coming from bin Laden. ...
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