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  • Subject: RE: Programing Question/Authority...
  • From: "Njal Fisketjon" <n.f@xxxxxxx>
  • Date: Fri, 27 Jul 2001 21:12:35 +0200
  • Importance: Normal



> -----Original Message-----
> From: owner-rpg400-l@midrange.com [mailto:owner-rpg400-l@midrange.com]On
> Behalf Of alan shore
> Sent: 27. juli 2001 18:18
> To: RPG400-L@midrange.com
> Subject: RE: Programing Question/Authority...
> 
> 
> PLEASE NOTE : No sarcasm is intended, however, I know that 
> sarcasm WILL be projected from my response to this.
> 
> Lets take this from the sublime to the WAY ridiculous.
> 
> Somebody requires access to High level Top secret documents, but 
> to obtain this data "they then have to jump through all sorts of hoops."
> 
> So lets make it easier to obtain this data. Oh, did'nt they do 
> that at some military installation in California just recently.
> Sarcasm switch now turned off.
> 
> Implementing a security procedure is NOT easy, and it is (or 
> should be) ALWAYS  revised. If it is hard for a person to be able 
> to obtain data, then surely the security is working. 
> Letting an application handle the security (even if users only 
> see the options they need to see) is NOT (this is strictly my 
> opinion) the procedure to use. If fred Bloggs should never have 
> access to the payroll master file, then the security should be in 
> place that he is NOT allowed access, even through the 
> application, thet he may or may not have. If he should have 
> access to the payroll master file, give him direct access. If 
> not, he falls into the category of PUBLIC *EXCLUDE.  
> 

The reasons we don't use object authority are:
- direct object authority lets the user access the data with whatever
tool he/she has available. With lots of applications created long before 
PF constraints and triggers were are part of the OS/400 database we think
it's very dangerous to specify direct user authority to files. 
We don't want the user to use ODBC, Client Access, etc to update AS/400
files at "free will".

- maintaining object authorities requires special care when database
changes are done.

By combining USRPRF(*OWNER) and application controlled authority per
program both at user and user group level (user groups defined in our
"menu system", because multiple groups per user was not available in
OS/400 at the time we created it), lets the application (system) owner
grant & revoke authorities. This has eased the workload of the DP staff.

If the system owner grants your "Fred Bloggs" update access to our Customer
Update program, he may do all what the program allows him do to.
No need to know which files (or views) you need access to (and which sort of
access).





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