On 5/12/14 4:16 PM, Mike Cunningham wrote:
Routine audits of the system audit logs looking for an security admin
who gave themselves access to a file they don't need to access
Hmm. By which time said admin would have probably had plenty of time to
get his or her hands into the cookie jar. Sounds "REactive, rather than
PROactive," and not much of an improvement over those same audits
catching the rogue admin actually ACCESSING the data.
Seems to me that a proper implementation would be like the usual drill
of two keys needed to access a safe deposit box: to grant a new user
access to the restricted object, one ought to need BOTH a user WITH
access to the object, and a user able to GRANT access to it, to sign off
on the authority.
Of course, up through V7R1, they would by definition be the same user.