RE: Audit

Does S/3 count?

Several employers ago, I was at a place where I really did think
embezzlement was going on. I presented management with what I thought was
convincing evidence & suggested that if there was to be an investigation, to
not include any of the following people, because it is important to clear
them ... each one had an opportunity to muck with the data. Management
created an investigation using ONLY those people, so the result was
predictable. I was told that people make mistakes, even multi million
dollar mistakes, that's not embezzlement. They explained that embezzlement
is not when people make computer errors to line their own pockets, but when
they steal company funds and run away with them to South America.

A few months later a lady was fired because, when opening company mail, she
diverted over $ 100,000.00 of customer payments into her private bank
account. Afterwards, I asked for clarification "That was not embezzlement,
because she did not escape to South America?" Correct, I was told, it was
just stealing.

Before I got into real life computer security, I had time to read detective
stories, and Inspector General reports. There was a Social Security
Administration Building that stored magnetic tapes of all of our tax returns
& everyone's social security #s. An IG GAO team found that if people pushed
on Emergency Exit doors, an alarm went off, but you could unscrew the alarm
from the door, while standing out of range of the building's security
cameras, then open the doors wide, to wheel out as many archived media as
you could carry, and it not show up on security logs or tapes ... The SSA
did not find out about the removal until IG-GAO making their report to
Congress.

A very interesting seminar at user groups and conferences is from some
outfit that got broken into ... what did their investigation show & how
easily could that have happened to us?

We pay taxes by e-commerce to state of Indiana.
State of Indiana banking system gets hacked into regularly.

What is the risk that spyware on an employee home computer will learn about
access to our i/400 systems? People get junk mail all the time and the
phishing is getting better. One of the companies in our user group was
stung by the payroll clerk getting phishing that led to phony employees
being created to get direct deposit paychecks.

In contemporary times, there have been computer breaches involving millions
of records, sometimes leading to law suits.

"We passed a computer security audit ... then we were breached ... the
computer security audit firm must not have done a proper job.

Well turns out the computer security audit did exactly what they were asked
to do, audit systems OTHER than the ones that ultimately got breached.

Also a lot of people don't seem to comprehend that security is a moving
target ... you could be secure today & insecure tomorrow.

Well we can learn from these stories.
Alarm systems are no good if they are easily circumvented.
Locked doors just make entry inconvenient, for someone who is able to climb
over the false ceiling.
Just assume that phishing will get thru to co-workers ... what are we gonna
do about it?

If a company wants a good audit, and its top managers do not have a thorough
understanding of all the stuff that maybe should be audited, limiing the
auditors to what gets audited could leave serious holes.

See this blog
http://infoseccompliance.blogspot.com/2008/02/legal-implications-risks-and-
problems.html

companies can royally screw themselves if they do not have good contracts to
enforce needed security

Pete Massiello wrote

Al,

Did you have another life before coming to the iSeries with anything
to do with breaking and entering ;)

You bring up some great points below.

Pete

-----Original Message-----
From: midrange-l-bounces@xxxxxxxxxxxx
[mailto:midrange-l-bounces@xxxxxxxxxxxx] On Behalf Of macwheel99@xxxxxxxxxx
Sent: Tuesday, November 25, 2008 7:46 PM
To: Midrange Systems Technical Discussion
Subject: Re: Audit

Good security requires people thinking outside the box, as well has
having a

good understanding of the box. In my experience companies do not use
computer security auditors who are familiar with the systems they
are auditing, let alone think outside the box.

Our accounting auditor is not familiar with our ERP ... they visit
many companies with great regularity where every single place they
audit is on a different ERP, and uses a different approach for their
paperwork. What a nightmare job! I told them about the Auditor's
manual about BPCS gotchas but they not have time to look at it. I
asked if they are interested in me telling them how easy it is to
embezzle with our system. No, they have been

asked only to audit certain things.

There are multiple packages out there to audit the 400/i whatever,
and some that are package-specific, where the developers of the
packages have a good understanding of trade-offs, then along comes
some auditors not relying on such packages, but instead know
something about UNIX, Windoze, 400/i, but do

not have a comprehensive picture of the real trade-offs, in a world
of perpetually evolving technology & risks.

Most of the places with the spectacular breaches had passed security
audits,

like were PCI-certified. That's because there usually is a huge
disconnect between what ought to get audited, and what does get audited.

We used to have the PCs for shipping / receiving right next to
loading docks, until personnel back turned, and the PCs took a hike.
They were moved further away for security, bolted down, then later
management moved them back because convenience to loading docks was
more important.

Many folks use VPN from home. This is on ISPs in trouble for
intercepting customer data streams to replace any ads with their own.

Remember the IBM office that was breached? The crooks never went
thru the locked door, where IBMers had to use mag strip on a plastic
card & key in some password & I forget what else. They broke into a
lightly secured office next door in the same building complex, then
went over the false ceilings to the IBM offices.

You ever drive past a factory where the padlock is hanging open from
the gate, for the convenience of closing time not having to have the
key handy?

Crooks can replace that with their own, show up at dead of nite,
unlock their oown, rob the place, then lock up with the company padlock.

Al Macintyre

Alan Shore wrote

Hi Rob
I used to work for a bank so we went through one of these at least once
every four months. A real pain in the @#$
However, to answer your question (at least I think you are asking a
question)
You are saying that there is no twinax that leaves the locked door
Well what about a disgruntled employee?
They can sign on cant they?
Ever heard of the phrase "Must have been an inside job"
All your other questions that the auditors seem not to be asking
should be a concern for you. It might also be a test by the
auditors. If you (the company) are not asking the auditors these
questions, the auditors may be thinking that the security of the box
may be a concern.

Good luck with the audit

Alan Shore
Programmer/Analyst, Distribution
E:AShore@xxxxxxxxxxx
P:(631) 200-5019
C:(631) 880-8640
"If you're going through Hell, keep going" - Winston Churchill

midrange-l-bounces@xxxxxxxxxxxx wrote on 11/25/2008 01:34:59 PM:

Boss is asking me to gather data for an IT audit. You know, I would be
hard pressed to find a worse waste of time. As usual, they want the

list

of system values. I am sure that is so they can consider it a ding if

we

allow a user to have more than one session. Doesn't matter if they can

go

to 30 PC's and fire up browsers and look at the data but two 5250

sessions

is a concern.
Then they have the usual commands they want to be secured: STRSEU,

UPDDTA

that sort of rot. Of course WRKQRY, RUNQRY QRYFILE..., STRSQL, EDTF

are

not in the list. And no mention of WDSC, etc.
And, why be concerned about the special authority of *ALLOBJ when they
don't check one file at all to see if you are using resource security?
Does it matter if no one has *ALLOBJ yet *public has *all authority to

the

list of social security numbers and everyone has iSeries Access (or

ftp,

or ...)?
Gee, why don't we tell them that there is no twinax that leaves the

locked

door? Based on the above wouldn't that then constitute a secured

system?

Rob Berendt
--
Group Dekko Services, LLC
Dept 01.073
Dock 108
6928N 400E
Kendallville, IN 46755
http://www.dekko.com

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